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Abstract	
Vulnerabilities	in	information	systems	have	always	been	the	Achilles	heel	of	digital	security.	
Ransomware-campaigns	such	as	WannaCry	and	(Not)Petya	highlighted	the	global	and	multi-
dimensional	nature	of	vulnerabilities	and	showed	how	substantial	the	impact	of	these	could	
be	 for	 many	 aspects	 of	 the	 daily	 life.	 Vulnerability	 disclosure	 is	 a	 valuable	 instrument	 to	
report	 and	 solve	 these	 vulnerabilities	 to	 increase	 the	 security	 of	 information	 systems	 and	
prevent	 such	 events	 from	 happening.	 However,	 EU’s	 legal	 landscape	 for	 vulnerability	
disclosure	is	fragmented,	and	vulnerability	researchers	have	to	deal	with	legal	uncertainty.	
Therefore,	 this	 thesis	 focuses	 on	 how	 the	 EU	 can	 increase	 the	 resilience	 of	 its	 cyber	
ecosystem	through	stimulating	vulnerability	disclosure.	The	purpose	of	this	study	will	be	to	
describe	 the	 different	 policy	 instruments	 the	 EU	 may	 use	 to	 stimulate	 coordinated	
vulnerability	disclosure	and	prescribe	which	ones	would	be	most	valuable	for	increasing	the	
EU’s	 cyber	 resilience.	 Coordinated	 vulnerability	 disclosure	 refers	 to	 the	 approach	 of	
disclosing	 vulnerabilities	 in	 the	 security	 of	 information	 systems	 in	 a	 controlled	 and	
responsible	manner.		
This	thesis	will	combine	an	analysis	of	primary	and	secondary	sources	–	using	technical	and	
non-technical	 perspectives	 to	 bring	 these	 two	worlds	 closer	 together	 to	 develop	 effective	
cybersecurity	policies.	To	provide	a	deeper	understanding	of	how	the	EU	could	construct	a	
resilient	cyber	ecosystem:	insight	on	cybersecurity,	the	resilience	of	ecosystems	and	security	
governance	 will	 be	 combined.	 Concluding,	 it	 is	 recommended	 that	 the	 EU	 uses	 a	 mix	 of	
regulatory	instruments	making	optimal	use	of	the	expertise	of	the	private	sector	to	stimulate	
coordinated	vulnerability	disclosure.	The	outcomes	are	timely	because	in	September	2017	a	
new	EU	Cyberstrategy	will	be	presented.	
	
Keywords:	 cyber	 resilience,	 cybersecurity,	 European	 Union,	 coordinated	 vulnerability	
disclosure,	regulatory	instruments.	
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1. INTRODUCTION	
Cyberspace	has	been	tremendously	growing	in	the	last	two	decades.	This	growth	has	had	an	
enormous	impact	on	all	parts	of	society.	Many	aspects	of	our	daily	lives	now	depend	on	the	
continuous	 functioning	 of	 information	 systems 1 	(European	 Commission	 (EC),	 2013).	
However,	because	of	this	 increasing	dependency,	the	potential	 impact	of	the	unavailability	
or	 insecurity	of	 information	systems	–	 for	all	parts	of	 society	–	has	made	us	vulnerable	 to	
threats.	 Vulnerabilities	 in	 information	 systems	 have	 always	 been	 and	 still	 are	 the	 Achilles	
heel	 of	 digital	 security	 (Cavoukian	&	Chanliau,	 2013;	 Schuster	 et	 al.,	 2017).	 This	was	once	
again	underlined	by	the	WannaCry	ransomware,	which	used	a	known	critical	vulnerability	in	
Microsoft	 Windows	 to	 encrypt	 files	 on	 computers	 that	 could	 only	 be	 decrypted	 and	
reaccessed	after	paying	a	fee	(European	Union	Agency	for	Network	and	Information	Security	
(ENISA),	 2017b;	 Herns	 &	 Gibbs,	 2017).	 Its	 broad	 and	 rapid	 distribution,	 affecting	
approximately	 more	 than	 150	 countries	 and	 infecting	 over	 230.000	 systems	 over	 the	
weekend	of	12th	–	14th	May	2017,	caused	chaos	all	over	the	world	(ENISA,	2017a).	European	
manufacturers,	service	providers	and	critical	infrastructure	operators	in	various	sectors	were	
affected	by	WannaCry	and	could	not	access	their	systems	(ENISA,	2017b).	Britain’s	hospitals,	
among	 others,	 could	 not	 access	 their	 systems	 and	 had	 to	 divert	 patients	 in	 need	 of	
immediate	treatment	and	reschedule	operations	(Gayle	et	al.,	2017).		
The	global	 impact	 and	quick	 spreading	of	WannaCry	 shows	how	 substantial	 the	 impact	of	
vulnerabilities	in	information	systems	can	be.	Over	the	last	decade,	the	impact	and	amount	
of	vulnerabilities	in	information	systems	demonstrates	a	constant	increase.2		Consequently,	
the	social	importance	of	dealing	effectively	with	vulnerabilities	and	increasing	cybersecurity3	
has	 become	 more	 prominent	 (Begum	 &	 Kumar,	 2016;	 ENISA,	 2015;	 Pawlak,	 2017).	
Moreover,	the	levels,	scope	and	damage	of	cybercrime	in	the	EU	have	exceeded	traditional	
crime	levels	(EC,	2013;	Europol,	2016).	
Therefore,	the	subject	of	cybersecurity	has	become	one	of	the	most	important	issues	on	the	
European	 Union’s	 (EU)	 political	 agenda	 in	 the	 last	 decade	 (Christou,	 2016;	 Leyden,	 2011;	
Pawlak,	2017).	After	WannaCry,	the	EC	has	highlighted	the	urgent	need	to	step	up	the	EU’s	
																																																						
1	An	information	system:	“refers	to	a	collection	of	multiple	pieces	of	equipment	involved	in	the	dissemination	
of	information.	Hardware,	software,	computer	system	connections	and	information,	information	system	users,	
and	the	system’s	housing	are	all	part	of	an	Information	system”	(Techopedia,	2017).	
2	According	to	annual	threat	reports	of	the	main	cybersecurity	companies,	the	last	three	years	on	annual	basis	
more	 than	6.000	new	vulnerabilities	were	 found.	Whereof	1000-1500	classified	as	high;	3000-3500	medium;	
and	the	remaining	low	looking	at	a	wide	variety	of	factors	(Cisco,	2017;	Microsoft,	2016;	Symantec,	2017).	
3	“Cybersecurity	 is	 the	 organization	 and	 collection	 of	 resources,	 processes	 and	structures	used	 to	 protect	
cyberspace	and	cyberspace-enabled	systems.”	(Craigen,	Diakun-Thibault,	&	Purse,	2014).	
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efforts	 to	 become	 cyber	 resilient4.	 It	will	 accelerate	 its	work	on	 cybersecurity,	 particularly	
through	 issuing	 a	 new	 updated	 Cybersecurity	 Strategy	 in	 September	 2017	 (EC,	 2017d,	
2017e).	The	EC	is	thus	currently	considering	which	actions	and	policies	are	necessary	to	deal	
effectively	with	cybersecurity	 issues	the	coming	years.	This	thesis	assesses	how	the	EU	can	
increase	its	resilience	in	cyberspace,	which	is	topical	and	relevant.		
Ransomware	 campaigns	 such	 as	WannaCry	 and	 (Not)Petya	 highlight	 the	 global	 and	multi-
dimensional	nature	of	vulnerabilities	in	information	systems	(Frenkel,	Scott	&	Mozur,	2017).	
It	underlines	the	need	to	combat	cyber	threats	on	all	levels	together	with	a	broad	range	of	
actors	 involved	 in	 the	 cybersecurity	 ecosystem	 (Christou,	 2016).	 To	 increase	 the	 EU’s	
resilience	 and	 security	 of	 information	 systems,	 identification	 and	 solving	 vulnerabilities	 in	
these	 systems	 is	 essential	 (ENISA,	 2015).	 In	 short,	 “vulnerabilities	 are	 flaws	or	mistakes	 in	
computer-based	systems	that	may	be	exploited	to	compromise	the	network	and	information	
security	 of	 affected	 systems”	 (ENISA,	 2015,	 p.	 7).	 The	 result	 of	 the	 successful	 use	 of	
vulnerabilities	 is	a	compromised	 information	system’s	security.	Due	to	 the	nature	of	 these	
systems,	 an	 infiltrator	 can	 “delay,	 disrupt,	 corrupt,	 exploit,	 destroy,	 steal	 and	 modify	
information	with	various	implications”	(Waltz,	1998).	There	are	several	ways	in	which	the	EU	
can	decrease	the	number	of	vulnerabilities	in	information	systems	and	prevent	exploitation	
of	them.	Examples	are	introducing	certification	schemes	for	software	and	hardware,	funding	
secure	 software	 development	 and	 stimulating	 coordinated	 vulnerability	 disclosure	 (CVD)	
(Schuster	 et	 al.,	 2017).	 The	 latter	 is	 “a	 process	 through	 which	 vendors	 and	 vulnerability	
finders	may	work	cooperatively	 in	 finding	solutions	that	reduce	the	risks	associated	with	a	
vulnerability”	 (ISO,	 2014).	 Furthermore,	 proper	 facilitation	 of	 vulnerability	 disclosure	 is	 of	
great	 importance	 to	 increase	 the	 EU’s	 cyber	 resilience	 (ENISA,	 2015).	 CVD	 is	 a	 valuable	
instrument	to	report	and	solve	vulnerabilities	 in	a	responsible	and	timely	manner,	 thereby	
decreasing	 exploitation	 of	 vulnerabilities	 (Falot	 &	 Schermer,	 2016;	 Schuster	 et	 al.,	 2017;	
Timmerman,	2013).	However,	EU’s	legal	landscape	for	vulnerability	researchers	is	currently	
fragmented	 (ENISA,	 2015).	 Vulnerability	 researchers	must	 deal	 with	 legal	 uncertainty	 and	
the	 risk	 of	 being	 sued,	 as	 all	 forms	 of	 hacking	 are	 a	 criminal	 offense	 according	 to	 a	wide	
variety	 of	 laws	 (Schuster	 et	 al.,	 2017).	 Consequently,	 researchers	 can	 choose	 to	 sell	 the	
information	on	the	black	market,	make	it	public	for	others	to	exploit	or	use	it	to	develop	new	
ways	 to	 exploit	 the	 vulnerability.	 A	 properly	 designed	 CVD	 policy	 would	 stimulate	
																																																						
4	Resilience	can	be	“understood	as	the	capacity	of	different	layers	of	society	to	withstand,	to	adapt	to,	and	to	
recover	quickly	from	stresses	and	shocks	and	has	gradually	emerged	as	the	answer	to	the	growing	complexity	
of	the	international	security	environment”	(Pawlak,	2016,	p.1).		
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researchers	 to	 responsibly	 disclose	 vulnerabilities	 because	 “the	 absence	 of	 a	 common	
practice	 often	 results	 in	 miscommunication,	 leading	 to	 ‘uncontrollable’	 vulnerability	
handling,	 confused	 or	 angry	 customers	 and	 unnecessary	 windows	 of	 opportunity	 for	
malicious	actions”	(Takanen	et	al.,	2004).	According	to	Cavusoglu,	Cavusoglu	&	Raghunathan	
(2005),	 ENISA	 (2015)	 and	 Falot	 &	 Schermer	 (2016),	 to	 prevent	 this	 from	 happening	
policymakers	in	the	EU	and	its	Member	States	(MS)	should	strengthen	the	legal	landscape	to	
stimulate	 the	 responsible	 reporting	 of	 vulnerabilities	 and	 come	 up	 with	 ways	 to	 proper	
facilitate	CVD.	Therefore,	the	following	question	will	be	answered	in	this	thesis:		
How	may	the	European	Union	use	its	regulatory	instruments	to	strengthen	the	resilience	
of	its	cyber	ecosystem	through	coordinated	vulnerability	disclosure?		
The	following	structure	will	be	followed	to	answer	this	question.	Chapter	2	will	introduce	the	
debate	about	ethical,	white	hat	and	black	hat	hackers,	 the	 legality	of	 (ethical)	hacking	and	
explain	why	proper	facilitation	of	CVD	is	 important	for	the	EU.	Followed	by	the	theoretical	
framework,	which	includes	insights	about	the	resilience	of	ecosystems,	security	governance	
and	EU	regulation	in	Chapter	3.	The	methodology	will	be	discussed	in	Chapter	4.	Chapter	5	
will	 introduce	 relevant	EU	 strategies	and	 legislation	 to	assess	whether	extra	measures	are	
necessary	to	stimulate	CVD.	Leading	to	a	discussion	of	the	possible	options	the	EU	may	use	
to	stimulate	CVD	and	increase	its	cyber	resilience	in	Chapter	6.	A	conclusion	of	a	prescriptive	
nature	will	be	given	assessing	which	combination	of	regulatory	instruments	the	EU	may	best	
use	to	strengthen	its	cyber	resilience	through	stimulating	CVD.	
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2. ETHICAL	HACKERS,	COORDINATED	VULNERABILITY	DISCLOSURE	AND	THE	EU	
The	process	of	disclosing	vulnerabilities	is	essential	because	it	is	one	of	the	first	steps	to	fix	
information	 systems	 and	protect	 data	 in	 cyberspace	 (van	der	Meulen,	 2016;	 Tai	&	Koops,	
2015):	 “as	 long	 as	 perfectly	 secure	 software	 is	 not	 available,	 the	 optimal	 distribution	 of	
vulnerability	 information	 is	 an	 important	 factor	 of	 the	 stability	 of	 a	 network	 society”	
(Böhme,	 2006,	 p.	 298).	 CVD	 can	 provide	 an	 incentive	 for	 developers	 to	 create	 secure	
software	 and	make	 sure	 that	 they	 patch	 vulnerabilities	 before	 attackers	 can	 exploit	 them	
(Mason,	 2012;	 Maurushat,	 2014).	 While	 attackers	 work	 in	 secrecy	 and	 do	 not	 have	 to	
comply	with	law,	ethics	or	public	scrutiny,	vulnerability	researchers	operate	in	the	open,	are	
restrained	 by	 ethics	 and	 must	 fear	 the	 ambiguity	 of	 the	 law.	 Researchers	 risk	 legal	
consequences	 when	 reporting	 a	 vulnerability,	 especially	 when	 they	 find	 this	 without	 the	
consent	of	the	system’s	owner	(Matwyshyn	et	al.,	2010;	Pfleeger	&	Pfleeger,	2006).	 In	this	
Chapter,	the	relevance	of	CVD	for	the	EU	will	be	discussed	by	zooming	into	the	differences	
between	white	hat,	black	hat	and	ethical	hackers.	Followed	by	a	discussion	on	the	legality	of	
hacking,	the	best	form	of	vulnerability	disclosure	and	an	overview	of	the	current	landscape	
for	vulnerability	disclosure	in	the	EU.		
2.1.	WHITE	HATS,	BLACK	HATS	&	ETHICAL	HACKERS	
In	 the	 literature	 two	 broad	 categories	 of	 hackers	 are	 distinguished:	 white	 and	 black	 hat	
hackers	 (Kirsch,	 2014;	Maurushat,	 2014;	 Cencini,	 Yu	&	 Chan,	 2005).	 Some	 identify	 a	 third	
intermediary	category:	gray	hat	hackers	(Lemos,	2002).		
A	white	hat	hacker	is	“someone	who	finds	or	exploits	security	holes	in	software	for	generally	
legitimate	 and	 lawful	 purposes,	 often	 to	 improve	 the	 overall	 security	 of	 products	 and	 to	
protect	users	from	black	hat	hackers”	(Cencini	et	al.,	2005,	p.	5).	While	a	black	hat	hacker	is	
an	 opposite:	 “someone	who	 uses	 his	 computer	 knowledge	 in	 criminal	 activities	 to	 obtain	
personal	benefits”	(Maurushat,	2014,	p.	76).	White	hats	are	those	that	usually	use	their	skills	
to	the	advantage	of	society	to	expose	vulnerabilities	before	black	hats	can	detect	and	exploit	
them	 (Techopedia,	 2017).	 Black	 hats	 go	 into	 systems	 for	 personal	 profits	 or	 to	 perform	 a	
crime	(Kirsch,	2014).	In	between	are	the	gray	hats,	who	perform	activities	on	the	border	of	
civil	 and	 criminal	 liability	 to	 find	 security	 vulnerabilities	 (Lemos,	 2002).	 They	 are	 often	
prepared	 to	 break	 the	 law	 to	 achieve	 the	 goal	 of	 improved	 security	 without	 consent	
(Electronic	Frontier	Foundation,	2008).		
The	 terms	 white	 hat	 and	 ethical	 hacker	 are	 often	 used	 interchangeably.	 The	 similarities	
become	visible	when	comparing	the	definitions:	“Ethical	hacking	is	the	non-violent	use	of	a	
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technology	in	the	pursuit	of	a	cause,	political	or	otherwise	which	is	often	legally	and	morally	
ambiguous”	(Samuel,	2004).	An	ethical	hacker	is	defined	as	someone:		
Who	 identifies	 a	 security	 weakness	 in	 a	 computer	 system	 or	 network	 but,	 instead	 of	
taking	 malicious	 advantage	 of	 it,	 exposes	 the	 weakness	 in	 a	 way	 that	 will	 allow	 the	
system's	owners	 to	 fix	 the	breach	before	 it	 can	be	 taken	advantage	by	others	 (Falot	&	
Schermer,	2016,	p.	1).		
When	comparing	 these	characteristics	of	white	hats	and	ethical	hackers,	a	 lot	of	 recurring	
characteristics	 become	 visible.	 The	 activities	 they	 perform	 are	 non-violent	 and	 non-
malicious,	 and	 pursue	 a	 cause	with	 the	 overarching	 belief	 of	making	 information	 systems	
more	secure.	In	this	thesis,	the	definition	of	Falot	&	Schermer	(2016)	will	be	used.	
2.2.	LEGALITY	OF	(ETHICAL)	HACKING	
It	 is	 important	to	briefly	discuss	the	difference	between	solicited	and	unsolicited	testing	of	
the	security	of	an	organization’s	network.	The	testing	of	systems	 is	often	done	by	security	
researchers	 who	 are	 hired	 by	 an	 organization	 to	 look	 for	 weaknesses	 in	 their	 systems.	
According	 to	Maurushat	 (2014),	 these	 security	 researchers	will	 not	 be	 subject	 to	 criminal	
sanctions	 because	 in	 the	 view	 of	 the	 law	 this	 will	 be	 proper	 authorization.	 The	 legal	
ambiguity	grows	when	 the	same	researcher	comes	across	a	vulnerability	 in	 its	 spare	 time,	
which	he	or	she	further	examines	without	consent	or	authorisation	from	the	system’s	owner	
(Falot	 &	 Schemer,	 2016).	 When	 disclosing	 such	 vulnerabilities,	 researchers	 risk	 criminal	
consequences	 and	 in	 many	 cases,	 will	 be	 found	 guilty	 of	 computer	 intrusion	 (Falot	 &	
Schermer,	 2016).	 Nevertheless,	 it	 does	 not	 automatically	 mean	 that	 when	 one	 finds	 and	
discloses	 vulnerabilities,	one	will	 be	prosecuted	or	 face	 criminal	 indictment.	 This	 is	mainly	
depended	on	 prosecutorial	will	 (Maurushat,	 2014).	 The	 focus	 of	 this	 thesis	will	 be	 on	 the	
latter,	 the	 so-called	 ethical	 hackers,	 which	 find	 vulnerabilities	 without	 the	 consent	 of	 the	
organization	with	as	aim	to	make	information	systems	more	secure	by	responsibly	disclosing	
vulnerability	information	to	the	system’s	owner.	As	will	be	discussed	later,	there	are	several	
forms	of	vulnerability	disclosure,	but	the	legality	of	all	these	forms	of	vulnerability	disclosure	
is	not	in	dispute;	it	is	illegal.			
Finding	 and	 disclosing	 vulnerabilities	 can	 thus	 be	 seen	 as	 legally	 and	 morally	 ambiguous	
(Maurushat,	2014).	According	to	Falot	&	Schermer	(2017),	Tavani	(2007),	Maurushat	(2014)	
and	Schuster	et	al.	(2017),	the	practice	of	vulnerability	disclosure	and	ethical	hacking,	should	
not	 be	 illegal	 per	 se	 when	 an	 ethical	 hacker	 finds	 and	 discloses	 the	 vulnerability	 in	 a	
controlled	 and	 responsible	 manner.	 They	 argue	 that	 reporting	 and	 fixing	 flaws	 timely	 is	
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essential	 for	 cybersecurity	 and	 benefits	 society	 by	 increasing	 the	 security	 of	 information	
systems	(ENISA,	2015;	Falot	&	Schermer,	2016;	Maurushat,	2014).	This	is	the	case	when	the	
information	 about	 the	 vulnerability	will	 be	 shared	 directly	with	 the	 organization,	 and	 this	
organization	 will	 be	 given	 a	 deadline	 to	 fix	 the	 vulnerability	 before	 the	 vulnerability	 will	
(possibly)	be,	 in	joint	consultation,	disclosed	to	the	public	(Falot	&	Schermer,	2016).	This	 is	
called	 coordinated	 vulnerability	 disclosure	 (CVD),	 which	 will	 be	 discussed	 in-depth	 in	
Paragraph	 2.3.	 Besides	 that,	 the	 threat	 of	 being	 sued	 in	 the	 current	 situation	 does	 not	
stimulate	 ethical	 hackers	 to	 report	 and	 disclose	 vulnerabilities	 responsibly.	 It	 rather	
stimulates	and	sustains	the	selling	of	vulnerabilities	on	the	black	market	(Baumbauer	&	Day,	
2010;	Schuster	et	al.,	2017).	It	can	be	argued	that	an	‘ethical’	intention	would	be	sufficient	in	
the	 absence	 of	 authorization	 since	 it	 does	 not	 change	 the	 common	 higher	 cause	 of	
improving	the	overall	security	of	information	systems	(Matswyshyn	et	al.,	2010;	Maurushat,	
2014).		
The	 study	of	 Falot	&	Schermer	 (2016)	will	 briefly	be	discussed	 to	 illustrate	 the	arguments	
about	the	situation	in	the	EU.	They	analyzed	the	situation	of	ethical	hacking	and	vulnerability	
disclosure	 in	 the	 Netherlands,	 Belgium	 and	 Germany.	 In	 all	 three	 countries,	 all	 forms	 of	
hacking	are	illegal,	and	there	is	no	legal	concept	of	ethical	hacking.		
In	the	Netherlands,	a	letter	of	the	Dutch	Public	Prosecutor	(DPP)	has	significantly	increased	
the	position	of	ethical	hackers.	The	DPP	stipulated	that	ethical	motives	and	proportionality	
will	be	considered	 in	cases	of	hacking.	 In	Germany	computer	 intrusion	 is	an	antragsdelikt,	
meaning	that	enforcement	will	only	take	place	when	an	organization	reports	it.	In	Belgium,	
the	motives	of	the	ethical	hacker	are	not	relevant	because	there	are	no	formal	grounds	for	
exclusion	in	the	law.	This	 is	underlined	by	the	Belgian	Federal	Public	Service:	“hackers	that	
from	the	outside	without	authorization	enter	computer	systems	are	always	punishable,	even	
when	 this	 is	 done	with	 the	 right	 intentions”	 (www.belgium.be).	 These	 examples	 illustrate	
the	legal	fragmentation	in	the	EU	and	make	disclosing	vulnerabilities	crossing	borders	a	risky	
endeavor	(Falot	&	Schermer,	2016).		
	
2.3.	WHY	IS	VULNERABILITY	DISCLOSURE	RELEVANT	FOR	THE	EU?	
Looking	closely	at	the	relevant	EU	cyber	strategies	and	documents	that	have	been	published	
the	past	 years,	 the	 recurring	message	 is	 that	 the	EU	wants	 to	 increase	 its	 cyber	 resilience	
and	strongly	reduce	cybercrime	(EC,	2013,	2016d;	European	External	Action	Service	(EEAS),	
2016;	 ENISA,	 2015).	 The	 resilience	 of	 information	 systems	 is	 crucial	 for	 successfully	
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completing	 the	 Digital	 Single	 Market	 (DSM)	 and	 ensuring	 the	 smooth	 functioning	 of	 the	
internal	 market	 (Tauwhare,	 2016).	 The	 largest	 challenges	 for	 EU	 regulation	 in	 the	 cyber	
domain	 are	 the	 facts	 that	 the	 global	 information	 space	 does	 not	 respect	 national	
boundaries,	 technology	develops	 rapidly,	 and	many	public	 and	private	 actors	 are	 involved	
(Carr,	2016;	Summers,	2015).	Particularly,	this	cross-border	dimension	of	cyberspace	justifies	
EU	actions	in	this	domain	(Summers,	2015).		
One	 of	 the	 problems	 with	 strengthening	 the	 security	 of	 information	 systems	 is	 that	
vulnerabilities	 are	 already	 part	 of	 those	 when	 offered	 on	 the	 market	 (Mason,	 2012).	
According	to	various	sources	(ENISA,	2015;	National	Cyber	Security	Centre	(NCSC),	2015a;	Tai	
&	Koops,	2015),	it	is	unlikely	that	this	issue	will	be	resolved	anytime	soon	because	in	practice	
it	 is	 tough	for	developers	 to	avoid	vulnerabilities	as	 information	systems	are	built	on	huge	
amounts	of	complex	lines	of	codes.		
2.3.1.	COORDINATED	VULNERABILITY	DISCLOSURE,	MOST	DESIRABLE?	
One	way	to	address	this	problem	is	to	strengthen	the	EU’s	cyber	resilience	by	using	the	tool	
of	CVD.	There	are	three	different	forms	of	vulnerability	disclosure	with	its	own	pros	and	cons	
that	are	subject	to	debate	for	many	years	now:	full-disclosure,	non-disclosure	and	CVD	(see	
Figure	1)	(Arora	&	Telang,	2005;	Berinato,	2007;	Cavusoglu	et	al.,	2005;	ENISA,	2015;	Falot	&	
Schermer,	2016;	Matwyshyn	et	al.,	2010;	NCSC,	2015a;	Parker	et	al.,	2004;	Preston	&	Lofton,	
2002;	Schneier,	2000;	Laakso,	Takanen	&	Röning,	1999;	van	der	Meulen,	2016).		
	
	
	
	
Figure	1a.	Schematic	overview	of	full-disclosure	process.	
	
Figure	1b.	Schematic	overview	of	non-disclosure	process.	
	
Figure	1c.	Schematic	overview	of	coordinated	vulnerability	disclosure	process.	
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Full-disclosure	is	the	term	used	for	publically	disclosing	vulnerabilities	without	contacting	the	
system’s	owner.	It	 is	based	on	the	idea	that	vulnerabilities	will	be	patched	quicker	through	
naming	and	shaming	(Cavusoglu	et	al.,	2005;	NCSC,	2015a;	Shepherd,	2003).	In	the	long	run,	
this	could	be	an	incentive	to	make	properly	designed,	tested	and	secured	by	design	products	
(Ellis,	2015;	Preston	&	Lofton,	2002;	Ryan	&	Heckman,	2003).	 It	 is	 thus	rather	a	correction	
mechanism	 if	 companies	 do	 not	want	 or	 do	 not	 fix	 the	 vulnerability	 quickly	 enough.	 Full-
disclosure	 is	 seen	 as	 irresponsible	 and	 reckless	 because	 it	 provides	 a	 window	 for	 the	
vulnerability	 to	 be	 exploited	 for	 illegal	 purposes	 (Schneier,	 2000;	 Ranum,	 2008).	
Consequently,	there	is	a	significant	risk	that	governments,	companies	or	users	are	harmed	–	
directly	or	indirectly	(Cavusoglu	et	al.,	2005;	Ellis,	2015;	Freeman,	2007;	NCSC,	2015a).		
Non-disclosure	refers	to	the	approach	of	keeping	the	vulnerability	information	secret	so	that	
the	public	never	 knows	about	 the	vulnerability,	 leaving	 systems	vulnerable	 to	exploitation	
until	 the	 information	becomes	public	and	the	vulnerability	 is	patched	(Cencini	et	al.,	2005;	
Shepherd,	2003).	Non-disclosure	has	more	disadvantages	than	advantages:	it	is	argued	that	
it	does	not	provide	a	guarantee	that	the	vulnerability	is	not	already	discovered	by	black	hats	
and	the	risks	for	system’s	users	are	severe	(Ellis,	2015;	Zina,	2009).		
CVD	presents	a	middle	way	 in	which	both	 the	vendor	and	 the	ethical	hacker	 can	come	 to	
terms	to	ensure	the	security	of	information	systems	for	society	(Stone,	2003).	It	refers	to	the	
approach	of	disclosing	vulnerabilities	in	information	systems	in	a	controlled	and	responsible	
manner	 (Falot	&	 Schermer,	 2016;	 Timmerman,	 2013)	where	 the	 vendor	 is	 first	 contacted	
about	a	vulnerability	in	their	systems	before	going	public	enabling	patching	and	preventing	
exploitation	of	the	vulnerability	(Ellis,	2015;	NCSC,	2015a).	A	CVD	policy5	is	based	on	a	set	of	
best	practices	about	how	the	cooperation	between	ethical	hackers	and	vendors	should	work	
to	 protect	 the	 users	 and	 prevent	 negative	 consequences	 of	 vulnerabilities	 (National	
Telecommunications	and	Information	Administration	(NTIA),	2016).	Main	elements	of	a	CVD	
policy	are	the	agreement	that	the	ethical	hacker	will	not	publish	details	of	the	vulnerability	
before	it	is	solved,	and	the	affected	organization	promises	that	no	legal	action	will	be	taken	
if	the	policy	is	followed	(NCSC,	2016).	In	practice,	after	a	specified	time-limit	–	between	45	
and	 60	 days	 is	 common	 –	 the	 vulnerability	 will	 be	 publicly	 released	 regardless	 of	 the	
vulnerability	 is	patched	by	the	vendor	(Cavusoglu	et	al.,	2005;	Ellis,	2015).	CVD	is	the	most	
desirable	approach	because	it	has	the	least	adverse	consequences	for	governments,	vendors	
and	 users.	 Moreover,	 nor	 the	 vendor	 or	 the	 ethical	 hacker	 can	 accuse	 the	 other	 of	
																																																						
5	In	Annex	1	and	2,	two	examples	of	CVD	policies	in	practice	are	presented.	
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irresponsible	 behavior	 in	 a	 CVD	 process	 (Stone,	 2003).	 The	 vendor	will	 be	 given	 a	 strong	
incentive	to	fix	the	vulnerability	without	jeopardizing	the	security	of	information	systems	as	
is	 the	 case	 with	 full	 disclosure	 (Schiller,	 2002).	 CVD	 offers	 a	 way	 for	 ethical	 hackers	 to	
straddle	two	worlds:	“it	allows	them	to	receive	prized	recognition	of	their	elite	skills	within	
the	community	of	hackers,	while	signaling	to	corporate	players	that	have	lucrative	security	
contracts	 to	 fill	 that	 they	are	 in	 fact	 responsible	actors”	 (Ellis,	2015,	p.	6).	A	well-designed	
CVD	policy	is	of	critical	importance	to	increase	the	security	of	information	systems,	counter	
cybercrime	and	lighten	the	workload	of	law	enforcement	(Maurushat,	2014;	Schuster	et	al.,	
2017).	Governments	should,	 therefore,	stimulate	the	use	of	CVD	policies	 (Cavusoglu	et	al.,	
2005).		
In	this	thesis,	the	term	CVD	will	be	used	instead	of	the	original	name	responsible	disclosure.	
The	 latter	was	 disapproved	 because	 it	 implies	 that	 only	 the	 ethical	 hacker	 is	 responsible,	
while	both	the	ethical	hacker	and	the	vendor	have	responsibilities	(NCSC,	2015a).	Moreover,	
ethical	hacking	and	CVD	will	be	used	 interchangeably	because	they	are	closely	 intertwined	
and	both	about	responsibly	disclosing	vulnerabilities.		
2.3.2.	EU’S	FRAGMENTED	LEGAL	LANDSCAPE	FOR	ETHICAL	HACKERS	
The	 legal	 landscape	 is	 still	 fragmented	on	 EU-level	which	makes	 it	 harder	 to	 implement	 a	
well-functioning	CVD	policy.	Moreover,	it	does	not	stimulate	ethical	hacking	and	thereby	the	
legal	 search	 for	 vulnerabilities	 (ENISA,	 2015;	 Schuster	 et	 al.	 2017).	 Operating	 in	 this	 area	
means	that	you	risk	being	prosecuted	on	a	broad	range	of	laws,	among	others:	“criminal	law	
for	hacking,	civil	liability,	breach	of	contract	and	copyright	issues”	(van	der	Meulen,	2016,	p.	
8).	However,	it	should	be	noted	that	even	if	MS	acknowledge	the	services	of	ethical	hackers,	
an	ethical	hacker	can	still	be	prosecuted	in	another	MS,	even	when	its	activities	are	legal	in	
the	 home	MS	 because	 of	 the	 lack	 of	 EU	 harmonization	 (ENISA,	 2015;	 Falot	 &	 Schermer,	
2016).	This	can	be	a	major	reason	for	the	EU	to	act	as	has	also	happened	in	aviation	sector6.	
In	Chapter	5,	an	overview	will	be	given	of	the	relevant	strategies,	regulations	and	policies	on	
the	 EU	 level	 relevant	 for	 a	 discussion	 about	 CVD,	 most	 notably	 the	 Convention	 on	
Cybercrime	(CoC)	and	the	Directive	on	Attacks	against	Information	Systems	(AIS).			
In	 the	 last	 years,	 an	 increasing	 amount	 of	 MS	 have	 taken	 measures	 or	 are	 actively	
considering	 the	 possibilities	 to	 increase	 the	 legal	 certainty	 of	 ethical	 hackers	 by	
																																																						
6	See	EU	(2014a)	on	the	reporting,	analysis	and	follow-up	of	occurrences	in	civil	aviation.		
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implementing	 national	 frameworks	 for	 CVD	 or	 using	 other	 means.	 The	 Netherlands7	and	
Finland8	have	been	active	proponents	of	CVD	for	a	couple	of	years	now.	Belgium9,	Italy10	and	
Latvia11	are	 currently	 working	 on	 a	 national	 framework	 for	 CVD.	 France12	and	 the	 United	
Kingdom	 (UK)13	have	 chosen	 to	 create	 a	 certification	 scheme	 for	 ethical	 hackers.	 Besides	
that,	 Hungary,	 Romania	 and	 the	 Netherlands	 are	 involved	 in	 a	 so-called	 cyber	 capacity	
building	initiative	to	share	CVD	best	practices	about	how	to	set	up	a	national	framework	in	
support	of	less-developed	countries	(www.thegfce.com).	
	
2.4.	CONCLUSION	
It	is	important	to	note	that	vulnerabilities	are	already	part	of	information	systems	offered	on	
the	market	leaving	governments,	companies	and	users	vulnerable.	A	solution	for	the	EU	to	
increase	its	cyber	resilience	would	be	to	decrease	the	number	of	vulnerabilities	by	making	it	
harder	for	actors	to	misuse	 information	systems	for	 illegal	purposes.	The	EU	could	achieve	
this	by	making	use	of	the	unsolicited	services	of	ethical	hackers	and	stimulate	CVD,	which	is	
the	most	 popular	 form	of	 vulnerability	 disclosure	 among	 the	 EU	 and	 its	MS,	 vendors	 and	
many	 ethical	 hackers.	 However,	 stimulating	 CVD	 is	 hard	 because	 all	 forms	 of	 hacking	 are	
illegal	 according	 to	 a	wide	 variety	 of	 laws	 in	 the	 EU	 and	 the	 legal	 landscape	 in	 the	 EU	 is	
fragmented.	Nevertheless,	 there	are	many	arguments	why	 the	activities	of	ethical	hackers	
and	well-designed	CVD	policies	should	be	stimulated	in	the	EU	to	strengthen	the	security	of	
information	systems	and	thereby	strengthen	the	EU’s	cyber	resilience.	 In	the	next	Chapter	
the	methodology	will	be	discussed.		
	
	
	
																																																						
7	The	Netherlands	 is	 one	 of	 the	 fore-runners	 in	 Europe	 according	 to	 ENISA	 (2015).	 The	Netherlands	 actively	
distributes	the	idea	of	CVD,	has	an	own	CVD	policy,	a	letter	of	the	Public	Prosecution	Service	about	how	they	
would	 deal	 with	 cases	 of	 CVD	 and	 a	 guideline	 for	 companies	 how	 to	 implement	 it	 (NCSC,	 2013,	 2015a;	
Openbaar	Ministerie,	2013).	
8	Finland’s	 national	 CERT	 (CERT-FI)	 is	 already	 playing	 an	 active	 role	 for	 some	 years	 now	 in	 vulnerability	
disclosure	(ENISA,	2015).	
9	The	Belgium	Minister	of	Justice	has	pledged,	 in	response	to	parliamentary	questions,	that	the	Cybersecurity	
Centrum	Belgium	will	in	2017	present	a	manual	for	responsible	disclosure	(van	Leemputten,	2016).	
10	Italian	Digital	Team	has	started	working	to	define	and	publish	a	national	policy	for	responsible	disclosure	in	
collaboration	with	CERT	Nationale	and	CERT-PA	(Bajo	&	Varisco,	2016).	
11	Latvia	is	chosen	because	they	are	currently	working	on	a	CVD	policy	and	intend	to	put	it	into	law	of	which	it	is	
the	first	country	in	the	world	to	do	this	(Bergman,	2015).		
12	More	information	on	https://www.ssi.gouv.fr/en/regulation/eidas-regulation/trusted-list/.	
13	NCSC-UK	works	closely	together	with	CREST	(non-profit	organization	which	certifies	ethical	hackers)	and	has	
recently	launched	the	NCSC	Vulnerability	Co-ordination	pilot	(T,	2017).	
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3. METHODOLOGY	
This	thesis	will	use	a	qualitative	approach	because	it	is	about	understanding	and	explaining	
the	 complex	 relations	 and	 interests	 of	 a	wide	 variety	 of	 actors	 in	 a	 complex	 context	 and	
environment	(Creswell,	2012;	Denney	&	Tewksbury,	2013;	Miller	&	Yang,	2007)	–	the	cyber	
ecosystem	of	the	EU.	The	study	object	cannot	be	expressed	in	numbers,	causally	determined	
and	predicted,	and	therefore	a	quantitative	approach	is	not	suitable	(Algozzine	&	Hancock,	
2006).	 Moreover,	 a	 qualitative	 approach	 is	 useful	 because	 the	 subject	 of	 this	 thesis	 is	 a	
relatively	new	area	of	research	and	it	provides	an	opportunity	to	look	in	detail	at	the	current	
situation	in	the	EU	concerning	cybersecurity	and	resilience.		
	
A	 single	 policy	 study	 design	 will	 be	 applied,	 which	 is	 one	 of	 the	 most	 used	 forms	 of	 EU	
research	(Kronsell	&	Manners,	2015).	Single	policy	studies	are	used	to	understand	the	role	
the	EU	plays	in	a	domain	and	can	provide	for	public	policy	prescriptions.	Advantages	of	this	
method	are	that	the	choice	of	method	or	theory	is	not	determined,	it	can	be	used	to	give	a	
critical	academic	perspective	on	public	policy	and	allows	for	acquiring	in-depth	knowledge	of	
processes,	actors	and	factors	 relevant	 to	a	specific	policy	 (Kronsell	&	Manners,	2015).	This	
thesis	will	employ	a	pragmatic	and	critical	approach	constructed	by	Christou	 (2016)	which	
blends	 literature	 on	 resilience	 and	 security	 governance	 to	 create	 a	 security	 as	 resilience	
approach.	
Furthermore,	 a	 hybrid	 form	of	 theory	 applying	 analysis	will	 be	used	 (Kronsell	&	Manners,	
2015)	 –	 combining	 a	 contemporary	 policy-descriptive	 and	 policy-prescriptive	 perspective	
focusing	 on	 current	 developments	 and	 conditions	 (van	 Evera,	 1997).	 Description	 must	
precede	 prescription	 and	 therefore	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 be	 descriptive	 first	 because	 little	 is	
known	about	the	subject	of	cyber	resilience	and	CVD	(van	Evera,	1997;	Yin,	2013).	Moreover,	
policy-prescriptive	analyses	are	very	well	suited	to	present	options	for	future	public	policies,	
although,	there	are	some	criticasters	that	state	policy-prescriptive	analysis	is	not	theoretical	
enough	(Kronsell	&	Manners	2015).	This	is	countered	by	the	fact	that	all	policy	proposals	are	
based	on	forecasts	about	the	effect	of	policies	(van	Evera,	1997).	Therefore,	it	is	important	
that	 in	 this	 thesis	 projections	 are	 substantiated	 with	 strong	 arguments	 and	 build	 upon	 a	
clear	 theoretical	 framework.	 To	 go	 beyond	 a	 purely	 descriptive	 thesis,	 the	 analysis	 in	 this	
thesis	 will	 focus	 on	 how	 and	 which	 different	 regulatory	 instruments	 the	 EU	 may	 use	 to	
properly	 facilitate	 vulnerability	 disclosure	 in	 the	 context	 of	 Morgan	 and	 Yeung’s	 (2007)	
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theoretical	 framework	 of	 regulatory	 instruments.	 This	 is	 placed	 in	 the	 broader	 context	 of	
conditions	for	the	EU	to	become	cyber	resilient	based	on	insights	of	Christou	(2016).		
Besides	 that,	 to	 build	 a	 strong	 argument	 and	 combine	 technical	 and	 non-technical	
perspectives,	a	literature	review	of	secondary	literature	will	be	combined	with	an	analysis	of	
a	 wide	 variety	 of	 primary	 documents	 in	 Chapter	 4	 –	 6	 to.	 Among	 others,	 EU	 and	 MS	
documents	 (e.g.	 policies,	 regulations,	 strategies),	 industry	 best	 practices	 and	 non-EU	
examples	of	 facilitating	CVD	will	 be	used.	Primary	 sources	are	an	essential	 condition	 for	a	
proper	 research	 and	 will	 be	 used	 to	 get	 as	 much	 information	 as	 possible	 on	 the	 table	
(Algozzine	 &	 Hancock,	 2006;	 Moumoutzis,	 2011;	 Trachtenberg,	 2009).	 In	 this	 thesis,	 an	
analysis	 of	 primary	 sources	 is	 appropriate	 because	 it	will	 provide	meaningful	 and	 original	
options	 for	 the	EU	to	 facilitate	vulnerability	disclosure,	which	 is	not	available	 in	secondary	
documentation.		
The	 suggested	 approach	 also	 has	 some	 limitations.	 The	 first	 is	 inherent	 to	 a	 single	 policy	
study	 with	 a	 focus	 on	 EU	 policy	 and	 is	 about	 setting	 boundaries	 (Denney	 &	 Tewskbury,	
2013).	Due	to	the	multilevel	and	multi-state	context	of	EU	policy,	a	broad	variety	of	actors,	
levels	and	institutions	are	 involved,	which	makes	 it	hard	to	decide	on	the	research’s	scope	
(van	der	Vleuten,	2012).	It	is	important	to	use	clear	theoretical	concepts	and	frameworks	to	
guide	the	study	(Yin,	2003).	For	that	reason,	the	focus	will	only	be	on	the	instrument	of	CVD	
in	 the	 context	of	 an	EU	 that	wants	 to	become	cyber	 resilient.	Other	 instruments	 that	 can	
also	 limit	the	number	of	vulnerabilities	and	contribute	to	the	EU’s	goal	such	as	security	by	
design	and	the	development	of	certification	schemes	will	be	disregarded.	An	accompanying	
disadvantage	 is	 that	 the	 study	 does	 not	 per	 se	 consider	 the	 larger	 (political)	 context	 and	
related	 developments	 in	 other	 sectors	 (Kronsell	 &	 Manners,	 2015).	 Besides	 that,	
prescriptions	will	always	be	a	 forecast	build	upon	the	current	situation,	but	due	to	 factors	
such	as	the	fast	development	of	technology,	evolving	threat	landscape	and	political	situation	
in	MS	and	the	EU,	it	will	be	hard	to	predict	the	effectiveness	of	proposed	instruments.	Lastly,	
the	analysis	of	primary	sources	can	have	some	limitations	because	only	public	documents	in	
a	few	EU	languages	can	be	studied,	while	many	MS	still	publish	governmental	documents	in	
their	native	language	and	there	is	still	much	secrecy	surrounding	cybersecurity	issues.		
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4. THEORETICAL	FRAMEWORK	
The	EU	has	the	ambition	to	increase	the	EU’s	cyber	resilience	but	does	not	adequately	define	
and	 deconstruct	 what	 cyber	 resilience	 is	 and	 which	 governance	 forms	 are	 necessary	 to	
achieve	it.	In	the	first	paragraph,	this	thesis	will	be	placed	in	the	broader	body	of	literature	
on	cybersecurity.	This	will	be	followed	by	discussing	the	essential	preconditions	for	creating	
a	 resilient	 cyber	 ecosystem	 and	 how	 this	 can	 be	 understood	 and	 analyzed.	 In	 the	 third	
paragraph,	these	ideas	are	combined	with	four	categories	of	regulatory	instruments	the	EU	
can	use	to	strengthen	its	cyber	resilience.		
4.1.	LITERATURE	ON	THE	EU	AND	CYBERSECURITY	
There	 is	 no	 abundance	 of	 theoretically	 informed	 literature	 focusing	 on	 cybersecurity	 and	
cybercrime.	This	body	of	literature	is,	however,	growing	quickly.	The	same	goes	for	related	
literature	about	cyber	warfare,	cyber	defense	and	cyber	terrorism.	The	latter	are	outside	the	
scope	of	this	thesis	and	will	not	be	further	discussed.	
The	 main	 body	 of	 literature	 on	 cybersecurity	 uses	 traditional	 and	 critical	 theories	 of	
International	Relations	such	as	the	concept	of	cyber	power	(Betz	&	Stevens,	2011;	Klimburg,	
2011;	 Klimburg	&	 Tiirmaa-Klaar,	 2011;	 Nye	 Jr,	 2010;	 Sliwinski,	 2014)	 and	 securitization	 of	
cyber	issues	in	the	UK	the	US	(Eriksson	2001;	Bendrath,	Eriksson	&	Giacomello,	2007;	Dunn	
Cavelty	2007,	2008).	Betz	and	Stevens	(2011)	and	Nye	Jr	(2010)	focus	on	cyber	power,	state	
strategy	 and	 the	 use	 soft	 and	 hard	 powers	 by	 states	 to	 counter	 cyber	 threats.	 They	
acknowledge	 that	 the	 importance	of	 non-state	 actors	 and	network	 governance	 is	 growing	
but	reach	the	conclusion	that	states	are	still	most	powerful	 in	 the	cyber	domain.	Klimburg	
(2011)	rather	believes	that	the	third	dimension	of	cyber	power	–public-private	cooperation	–	
is	most	valuable	 looking	at	the	nature	of	cyberspace	(Klimburg,	2011).	Particularly	because	
of	the	many	actors	involved,	fast	technological	developments	and	the	privatization	of	critical	
infrastructures	 (Carr,	 2016).	 Betz	 and	 Stevens	 (2011),	 Nye	 Jr	 (2010)	 and	 Klimburg	 (2011),	
however,	mainly	assess	the	 issue	of	cybersecurity	 from	a	traditional	 international	relations	
perspective	as	a	new	area	of	conflict	between	the	great	powers.	If	they	address	the	EU	at	all,	
it	is	about	the	resilience	of	the	EU	vis-à-vis	other	great	powers	and	not	about	cyber	resilience	
inside	the	EU.	
Few	authors	do	address	 the	EU	and	cyber	 resilience	within	 the	EU.	Klimburg	and	Tiirmaa-
Klaar	(2011),	for	example,	argue	that	the	public-private	cooperation	dimension	in	the	EU	is	
underdeveloped	 and	 should	 be	 strengthened.	 This	 is	 underlined	 by	 Swilinksi	 (2014),	 who	
argues	 that	 the	 EU,	 its	 MS	 and	 other	 non-state	 actors	 must	 work	 together	 and	 create	 a	
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collective	vision	to	strengthen	cybersecurity.	Moreover,	works	on	cybersecurity	(Bossong	&	
Wagner,	2016;	Carrapico	&	Barrinha,	2017;	Christou,	2014,	2016;	Klimburg	&	Tiirmaa-Klaar,	
2011;	Schellekens,	2016;	Sliwinski,	2014;	van	der	Meulen,	Jo	&	Soesanto,	2015)	and	public-
private	 cooperation	 in	 cyberspace	 remain	 rather	 limited	 (Carr,	 2016;	 Dunn	 Cavelty,	 2013,	
2014).		
These	 works	 do	 not	 address	 forms	 of	 hacking	 and	 vulnerability	 disclosure	 in	 the	 EU.	 In	
general,	 the	 concepts	 of	 ethical	 hacking	 and	 vulnerability	 disclosure	 are	 under-researched	
from	non-technical	perspectives,	while	in	the	technical	literature	it	are	no	new	phenomena	
(Cavusoglu	 et	 al.,	 2005;	 Laakso	 et	 al.,	 1999).	 Most	 books	 on	 (ethical)	 hacking	 and	
vulnerability	 disclosure	 are	manuals	 (e.g.	 Engebretson,	 2013;	 Graves,	 2010;	 Harper	 et	 al.,	
2011)	or	use	a	quantitative	approach	looking	at	statistics	of	vulnerability	disclosure	to	assess	
whether	the	process	is	effective	(Algarni,	2016;	Böhme,	2006;	Cavusoglu	et	al.	2005;	Havana,	
2004;	 Arora,	 Telang	&	 Xu,	 2008).	Moreover,	 a	 limited	 body	 of	works	 focus	 on	 the	 ethical	
aspects	 (Dudley,	 Braman	 &	 Vincenti,	 2012;	 Matwyshyn	 et	 al.,	 2010;	 Maurushat,	 2014;	
Takanen	et	al.,	2004;	Wolfs	&	Fresco,	2016)	or	legal	aspects	of	vulnerability	disclosure	in	the	
US	(Baumbauer	&	Day,	2010;	Bergman,	2015;	Preston	and	Lofton,	2002;	Schwartz	&	Knake,	
2016).		
Unfortunately,	 all	 listed	 literature	does	not	bring	 the	 technical	 and	 the	non-technical	 (e.g.	
policy,	 legal	 and	 political)	worlds	 closer	 together.	 It	 is	 often	 argued	 that	 it	 is	 essential	 for	
policymakers	 to	 bridge	 the	 gap	 between	 these	 two	worlds	 because	 both	 sides	 need	 each	
other	to	develop	effective	and	efficient	cybersecurity	policies	(OECD,	2012;	Kleiner,	Nicholas	
&	Sullivan,	2013).	Besides	that,	the	non-technical	side	of	vulnerability	disclosure	and	ethical	
hacking	 is	 still	 under-researched.	 Some	 positive	 exemptions	 are	 Falot	 &	 Schermer	 (2016)	
who	 analyzed	 the	 legality	 of	 ethical	 hacking	 in	 cross-border	 cases	 in	 the	 EU;	 Schellekens	
(2016)	who	investigated	whether	car	hacking	should	be	regulated	in	the	EU	and	US,	and	if	so	
how	this	could	be	done;	and	Christou’s	book	(2016)	which	integrates	ideas	about	resilience,	
ecosystems	and	security	governance,	and	applies	these	to	cyber	issues	in	the	EU.	The	latter	
will	be	discussed	in	the	next	paragraph.		
	
4.2.	UNDERSTANDING	CONDITIONS	FOR	DEVELOPING	A	RESILIENT	CYBER	ECOSYSTEM	
Resilience	can	be	“understood	as	the	capacity	of	different	layers	of	society	to	withstand,	to	
adapt	to	and	to	recover	quickly	from	stresses	and	shocks	and	has	gradually	emerged	as	the	
answer	to	the	growing	complexity	of	the	international	security	environment”	(Pawlak,	2016,	
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p.1).	A	 resilient	 state	 is	 not	 immune	 to	 challenges	but	 can	 respond	 flexibly	 and	 rapidly	 to	
guarantee	an	appropriate	level	of	state	functioning	(EUISS,	2017). 
Christou	 (2016)	 is	one	of	 the	 first	 that	used	notions	of	 resilience	and	applied	 these	 to	 the	
cyber	domain,	academically	introducing	cyber	resilience.	The	concept	of	cyber	resilience	has	
returned	in	various	EU	documents	without	properly	defining	what	this	concept	entails	 (EC,	
2013,	 2016).	 Christou’s	 (2016)	 framework	 helps	 to	 explain	 “the	 evolution	 of	 the	 EU	
governance	system	for	cybersecurity	to	provide	a	deeper	understanding	of	how	the	EU	can	
construct	an	ecosystem	of	resilient	security	governance”	(p.	12),	which	 is	“underpinned	by	
instruments,	tools	and	mechanisms	that	allow	the	EU	to	achieve	a	more	secure	cyberspace”	
(p.	21).		
Christou’s	 (2016)	 framework	 combines	 concepts	 of	 resilience	 and	 security	 governance	 to	
develop	a	security	as	resilience	approach	(Kavalski,	2009,	p.	532).	The	security	as	resilience	
approach	 does	 not	 only	 look	 at	 governance	 mechanisms	 applicable	 to	 cybersecurity	 but	
rather	 provides	 an	 understanding	 of	 the	 instruments,	 relationships,	 characteristics	 and	
processes	that	can	stimulate	the	development	of	a	cyber	resilient	EU.	This	approach	is	more	
suitable	to	the	issue	of	cybersecurity	than	the	traditional	concept	of	security	of	control	that	
only	 focuses	 on	 change	 within	 and	 between	 systems	 (Webber	 et	 al.,	 2004;	 Kirchner	 and	
Sperling,	 2007;	Wagnsson,	 Sperling	&	Hallenberg,	 2009).	 In	 resilient	 systems,	 it	 should	 be	
possible	 for	 new	 adaptable	 regime(s)	 to	 develop	 in	 reaction	 to	 new	 conditions	 and	
incentives	 (Handmer	 and	 Dovers,	 1996).	 Handmer	 &	 Dovers	 (1996),	 introduced	 three	
typologies	of	resilience	as	displayed	in	Table	1.		
	
Table	1	
Typologies	of	Resilience	
Type	 Characteristics	
1. 	Resistance	and	Maintenance	 Sovereignty,	hierarchical	governance,	state	control	of	
information,	resistance	change	
2. 	Change	at	the	Margins	
	
Risk	management	underpinned	by	traditional	linear	
risk	assessment,	acknowledgement	of	problems	&	
need	for	change,	problem-solving	approach,	no	
transformability	but	effect	outcomes	at	the	margins,	
addressing	symptoms	instead	of	cause	
3.	 Openness	and	Adaptability	
	
Partnerships,	flexibility,	adaptability,	address	causes,	
self-regulating,	non-hierarchical		
Note.	Based	on	information	from	“A	typology	of	resilience:	rethinking	institutions	for	sustainable	development”,	J.	
Handmer	&	S.	Dovers,	1996,	Organization	&	Environment,	9(4),	495-499).	
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Typology	 3	 is	 most	 suitable	 to	 reflect	 on	 the	 resilience	 of	 the	 developing	 ecosystem	 of	
resilient	cybersecurity	governance	in	the	EU.	It	is	“characterized	by	flexibility	and	the	ability	
and	 preparedness	 to	 adopt	 new	basic	 operating	 assumptions	 and	 institutional	 structures”	
(Handmer	 &	 Dovers,	 1996,	 p.	 602).	 From	 a	 governance	 perspective,	 it	 shall	 lead	 to	 a	
significant	 change	 in	 power	 relationships,	 participation	 and	 inclusiveness	 –	 self-organized	
and	non-hierarchical.	Actors	are	expected	to	seize	new	ideas	and	embark	major	changes	in	
developing	an	ecosystem	that	can	decrease	its	vulnerability	to	threats.	
Another	 feature	of	 Type	3	 is	 that	 its	 success	 depends	on	 to	what	 extent	 the	 coalitions	 of	
actors	 can	work	 together	 to	 tackle	 the	problems	occurring	 in	 cyberspace	 (Christou,	2016).	
Not	only	dealing	with	the	symptoms	but	also	with	the	causes	of	cybersecurity	problems	at	all	
levels.	 Moreover,	 it	 helps	 us	 to	 understand	 the	 characteristics	 and	 relationships	 that	
originate	in	the	cyber	ecosystem	of	the	EU	and	enables	an	analysis	of	the	general	conditions	
that	are	necessary	for	creating	a	resilient	cyber	ecosystem	in	the	EU	(see	Table	2).		
	
The	framework	of	Table	2	 is	very	suitable	for	this	thesis	because	 it	attaches	great	value	to	
collaboration	 between	 stakeholders	 and	 the	 unique	 nature	 of	 cyberspace	where	 different	
public	 and	 private	 actors	 are	 involved	 which	 calls	 for	 coordination	 and	 communication	
(ENISA,	2015;	Schellekens,	2016).	
Table	2	
Conditions	for	developing	a	resilient	cyber	ecosystem	
Ability	(including	resource	and	mandate)	and	preparedness	to	adopt	new	basic	operating	
assumptions	and	institutional	structures;	
Assumption	of	efficiency	abandoned	in	favour	of	complexity	in	governance	logics	in	order	
to	avoid	single	points	of	threat	and	failure;	
Coalitions	of	actors	working	together	in	‘partnerships’	based	on	trust	to	share	information,	
construct	new	flexible	and	adaptive	institutions	and	operating	procedures,	set	the	agenda	
and	construct/implement	policies;	
Convergence	amongst	stakeholders	on	a	‘common’	understanding,	logic(s),	‘norms’,	laws	
and	standards	of	security	as	resilience;	
Evolution	of	a	culture	of	cybersecurity	at	all	levels	and	layers	(technical,	legal,	policy)	
among	all	stakeholders	(awareness,	education,	learning	and	so	on);	
An	integrated	approach	(coherence	and	consistency	across	layers,	levels,	actors).	
Note.	 Conditions	 for	 achieving	 effective	 security	 as	 resilience	 in	 cyberspace.	 Adapted	 from	 “Cybersecurity	 in	 the	
European	Union:	Resilience	and	Adaptability	 in	Governance	Policy”,	by	G.	Christou,	2016,	New	York,	NY:	Palgrave	
Macmillan.			
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4.3.	FOUR	REGULATORY	INSTRUMENTS	FOR	THE	EU	
Legislation	in	cyberspace	is	no	silver	bullet	and	developing	a	resilient	cyber	ecosystem	is	not	
something	which	can	be	achieved	solely	by	 legislation	(Dunn	&	Cavelty,	2009;	Schellekens,	
2016).	The	relationship	between	black	hats	and	those	that	try	to	decrease	vulnerabilities	is	
characterized	by	competition:	an	arms	race	between	those	that	are	looking	to	discover	and	
exploit	vulnerabilities	versus	those	that	seek	to	solve	vulnerabilities.	The	consequence	of	this	
relation	 is	 dynamism	 which	 makes	 it	 very	 hard	 to	 regulate	 in	 this	 domain	 (Schellekens,	
2016).	Consequently,	governments	should	not	legislate	without	involving	other	actors	as	is	in	
line	with	the	ideas	of	Christou	(2016)	about	a	resilient	cyber	ecosystem.		
Christou’s	 framework	 will	 be	 combined	 with	 four	 categories	 of	 regulatory	 instruments	
developed	by	Morgan	and	Yeung	(2007)	to	analyze	which	policy	options	the	EU	can	use	to	
strengthen	 the	 resilience	 of	 its	 cyber	 ecosystem	 through	 CVD.	Morgan	 and	 Yeung	 (2007)	
have	combined	insights	from	a	wide	range	of	academic	disciplines.	One	important	common	
element	of	all	this	literature	is	that	they	all	try	“to	understand	and	explore	instruments	and	
techniques	 by	 and	 through	which	 social	 behavior	may	 be	 regulated,	 and	 the	 relationship	
between	 those	 techniques	 and	 their	 context”	 (Morgan	 &	 Yeung,	 2007,	 p.	 79).	 They	
emphasize	that	the	framework	not	explains	regulation,	but	rather	reviews	how	to	regulate.	
Morgan	 and	 Yeung	 (2007)	 introduce	 five	 groups	 of	 regulatory	 instruments	 with	 its	
accompanying	 modalities	 in	 which	 they	 try	 to	 control	 behavior:	 “command,	 competition,	
consensus,	communication	and	code	(or	architecture)”	(Morgan	&	Yeung,	2007,	p.	80).	
The	code-based	instruments	are	based	on	works	of	Lawrence	Lessig	(1999,	2006).	He	argues	
that	 regulation	 in	 cyberspace	 can	 perfectly	 reach	 its	 goals	 by	 changing	 software	 codes,	
foreshadowing	the	 idea	that	“law	as	code	 is	 the	start	 to	the	perfect	 technology	of	 justice”	
(Lessig,	1999).	This	group	of	instruments	will	not	be	used	for	further	analysis	because	the	EU	
or	 its	MS	 cannot	 provide	 code	 itself	 because	 of	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 cyber	 domain.	 It	 goes	
beyond	 the	 scope	 of	 this	 thesis	 to	 discuss	 how	 governments	 can	 sway	 the	 international	
private	sector	to	develop	hundred	percent	secure	code	(Brownsword,	2005).	
Furthermore,	the	boundaries	between	these	four	instruments	are	not	watertight,	and	many	
instruments	 can	 use	 different	mechanisms	 and	 are	 thus	 rather	 hybrids	 (Morgan	&	 Yeung,	
2007).	Moreover,	no	single	 instrument	will	provide	the	solution,	rather	a	broad	 lens	and	a	
right	mix	of	instruments	is	needed	to	increase	cybersecurity	in	the	EU	(Schellekens,	2016).		
Strengthening	the	digital	Achilles	heel	of	the	European	Union	
Gijs	Peeters	S1584103	 23	
4.3.1.	COMMAND	
This	category	of	mechanisms	includes	the	creation	of	laws	by	governments	to	regulate	and	
compel	 specified	 behavior,	 supported	 with	 coercive	 sanctions	 if	 the	 rules	 are	 violated	
(Morgan	&	Yeung,	2007).	This	refers	to	traditional	command-and-control	regulation	wherein	
the	government	creates	laws	to	achieve	policy	objectives	(Daintith,	1997).	Important	in	the	
EU	is	that	regulation	should	adhere	to	the	principles	of	subsidiarity	and	proportionality:	the	
EU	must	show	that	it	can	better	solve	the	problem	than	the	MS,	and	EU	action	must	not	go	
further	than	required	to	achieve	the	objective	(Chalmers	&	Arnull,	2015).		
Command-and-control	 rules	 are	 important	 but	 are	 most	 suitable	 to	 set	 the	 framework.	
Actual	security	measures	and	effective	regulation,	especially	 in	 the	cyber	domain,	 requires	
detailed	 and	 practical	 information	 which	 is	 usually	 not	 available	 to	 the	 legislator.	 Close	
collaboration	with	stakeholders	is,	therefore,	essential.	Self-regulation	can	provide	a	solution	
and	build	upon	command	rules	(Morgan	&	Yeung,	2007;	Schellekens,	2016).	
4.3.2.	COMPETITION	
The	last	decades,	command-based	instruments	have	lost	their	attraction	because	of	a	wide	
range	of	shortcomings	such	as	high	costs,	negative	incentives	and	difficulties	when	used	in	
cases	of	uncertainty	(Morgan	&	Yeung,	2007;	Ogus,	1994)	–	one	of	the	major	characteristics	
of	 cyberspace.	 In	 cyberspace,	 technological	 developments	 evolve	 quicker	 than	 regulation,	
which	increases	the	level	of	uncertainty	about	the	effectiveness	of	these	rules.		
Competition	 is	about	the	group	of	 instruments	that	use	the	competitiveness	of	markets	to	
regulate	 social	 behaviour.	 This	 does	 not	mean	 the	 law	 is	 not	 involved:	 it	 can	 play	 a	 vital	
facilitative	role	(Morgan	&	Yeung,	2007).	Relevant	(economic)	instruments	in	this	regard	are:	
“charges,	taxes,	subsidies,	.	 .	 .	 ,	 liability	rules”	(Schellekens,	2016,	p.	312).	In	short,	charges	
and	 taxes	 are	 used	 to	 correct	misallocations	 derivative	 of	 externalities	 (Morgan	&	 Yeung,	
2007).	 Subsidies	 are	 the	positive	opposite:	money	 is	 given	 to	motivate	 actors	 to	decrease	
undesirable	behavior.	Liability	rules	can	help	to	ensure	a	higher	level	of	security	and	safety	
users	would	receive	without	these	rules	(Breyer,	1982).		
4.3.3.	CONSENSUS	
Law	also	has	a	facilitative	role	in	the	third	broad	group	of	regulatory	instruments:	Consensus.	
The	 biggest	 difference	with	 the	 other	 groups	 of	 instruments	 is	 that	 these	 build	 upon	 the	
consent	of	its	participants.	Moreover,	sanctions	for	violating	consensus	instruments	are,	for	
example,	social	disapproval	or	ostracism,	rather	than	legal	coercive	sanctions.	The	threat	of	
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law	 is	 still	 present	 in	 some	 form	 but	 can	 also	 be	 constructed	 with	 the	 consent	 of	 the	
community	 (Morgan	&	 Yeung,	 2007).	 Regulation	 could	 help	 to	 build	 trust	 between	 public	
and	private	actors	and	create	the	frame	in	which	information	could	be	exchanged	between	
actors	(Schellekens,	2016).	There	are	a	wide	variety	of	consensus-based	instruments,	but	the	
focus	will	be	on	two	variants:	 self-regulation	and	public-private	partnerships	 (PPP).	One	of	
the	big	advantages	of	self-regulation	and	PPP	is	that	the	expertise	of	the	private	sector	can	
be	fully	utilized.	Cybersecurity	 is	a	highly	technical	subject	and,	therefore,	 it	can	be	a	good	
area	for	self-regulation	(Schellekens,	2016).	A	pitfall	of	self-regulation	can	be	 its	 liability	 to	
regulatory	 capture:	 cybersecurity	 is	 not	 always	 on	 the	 top	 of	 mind	 of	 companies	 and	 a	
regulatory	capture	looms	(Ogus,	1995;	Schellekens,	2016).		
4.3.4.	COMMUNICATION	
The	 power	 of	 social	 norms	 and	 consensus	 are	 underpinning	 the	 power	 of	 the	
communication-based	 instruments.	 These	 instruments	 regulate	 behavior	 by	 improving	 the	
information	 vis-a-vis	 the	 target	 audience	 and	 thereby	make	 it	 possible	 for	 them	 to	make	
more	informed	choices	about	how	to	behave.	Consequently,	“the	aim	is	therefore	to	bring	
indirect	social	pressure	to	bear	on	individual	decision-making	in	the	hope	that	it	will	lead	to	
behavioral	change”	(Morgan	&	Yeung,	p.	96).	Communicative	regulatory	instruments	are,	for	
example,	public	education	campaigns,	mandatory	and	voluntary	disclosure	 regimes,	public	
communication	management,	and	transparency	measures	(Yeung,	2005).	
	
4.4.	CONCLUSION	
Blending	the	 ideas	of	resilience	and	security	governance	gives	valuable	 insights	 in	the	EU’s	
developing	cyber	ecosystem.	Table	2	and	the	concept	of	security	as	resilience	provides	more	
understanding	about	how	the	EU	can	strengthen	the	resilience	of	its	cyber	ecosystem	paying	
attention	to	the	involved	actors,	networks,	institutions	and	instruments.	It	is	important	that	
the	EU	 can	quickly	 adapt	 and	 react	 to	new	 technological	 developments	 and	 fast	 changing	
threat	landscapes.	This	framework	will	be	used	to	analyze	the	role	the	EU	plays	and	should	
play	in	the	cyber	domain	and	sketches	the	context	in	which	there	will	be	zoomed	in	on	the	
CVD	process	and	the	four	possible	instruments	the	EU	can	use	to	stimulate	this.	It	should	be	
noted	 that	 this	 model	 is	 fluent	 and	 many	 instruments	 are	 based	 on	 more	 than	 one	
mechanism	to	regulate	behavior,	so-called	hybrid	instruments.		
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5. EU	STRATEGIES,	REGULATIONS	AND	INTERNATIONAL	NORMS	
Before	continuing	to	the	analysis	of	possible	options	for	the	EU	to	stimulate	ethical	hacking	
and	CVD,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 review	which	 legislation	 is	already	 in	place	 relating	 to	 (ethical)	
hacking	 and	 CVD	 to	 assess	 whether	 extra	 measures	 are	 necessary.	 Consequently,	 this	
Chapter	 will	 focus	 on	 the	 relevant	 EU	 strategies,	 regulations	 and	 EU’s	 agreements	 in	
multilateral	fora	important	for	stimulating	CVD.		
	
5.1.	EU	POLICIES	AND	STRATEGIES	
Over	the	past	few	years,	many	documents	have	been	published	that	guide	the	EU	activities	
concerning	cybersecurity,	including	the:	
1. European	Cybersecurity	Strategy	(EC,	2013);	
2. European	Agenda	of	Security	(EC,	2015a);	
3. Digital	Single	Market	Strategy	(EC,	2015b);	
4. Joint	Framework	on	Countering	Hybrid	Threats	a	European	Union	Response	(2016a);	
5. The	EU’s	Global	Strategy	for	its	Foreign	and	Security	Policy	(EEAS,	2016);		
6. Communication	on	Strengthening	Europe’s	Cyber	Resilience	System	(EC,	2016d).	
For	 the	 EC,	 there	 are	 three	 top	 priorities	 concerning	 cybersecurity	 for	 the	 coming	 years:	
increasing	cybersecurity	capabilities	in	the	EU	and	strengthen	cooperation;	making	the	EU	a	
strong	 (international)	 player	 in	 cybersecurity;	 and	mainstream	cybersecurity	 in	 EU	policies	
(EC,	2017a).	
	
5.2.	EU	REGULATIONS	
Several	 regulations	 have	 been	 adopted	 and	 are	 implemented,	 or	 currently	 being	
implemented	by	the	EU,	of	which	the	most	relevant	for	cybersecurity	and	CVD	are	the:	
1. Directive	on	Attacks	against	 Information	Systems	 (AIS)	 (EU,	2013)	which	has	been	
fully	 implemented	 on	 September	 2015	 and	 builds	 upon	 the	 Convention	 on	
Cybercrime	(CoC).	It	focuses	on	cybercrime.		
2. The	General	Data	Protection	Regulation	(GDPR)	(EU,	2016a)	which	applies	from	25	
May	2018	with	as	focus	data	protection.	
3. Directive	on	Network	and	Information	Security	(NIS)	(EU,	2016b)	which	needs	to	be	
implemented	before	9	May	2018	and	focuses	on	cybersecurity.	
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5.2.1.	EU	CYBERCRIME	REGULATION		
As	mentioned	before,	ethical	hackers	face	legal	uncertainty	when	disclosing	vulnerabilities,	
particularly	because	of	the	criminalization	of	hacking	in	the	CoC	(Council	of	Europe,	2001)14	
and	the	AIS	Directive	(EU,	2013).	The	CoC	is	signed	by	all	28	EU	MS15	and	is	built	on	the	idea	
that	there	should	be	some	degree	of	global	harmonization	if	effective	cybercrime	regulation	
is	to	be	achieved	(Clough,	2014).		
Consequently,	finding	a	vulnerability	and	responsibly	disclosing	this	as	ethical	hacker	will	be	
punishable	because,	 among	others,	 it	 can	qualify	 as	 a	 form	of	unauthorized	access	 (art.	 2	
CoC;	 art.	 3	 Dir	 AIS),	 illegal	 system	 interference	 (art.	 5	 CoC;	 art.	 4	 Dir	 AIS),	 or	 illegal	 data	
interference	 (art.	 4	 CoC;	 art.	 5	 Dir	 AIS).	 Mandated	 testing	 of	 an	 information	 system	 on	
request	 of	 a	 company	 or	 vendor	 is	 exempted	 from	 criminal	 liability	 according	 to	 the	 AIS	
Directive.	 In	 both	 the	 CoC	 and	 the	 AIS	 Directive	 there	 is	 no	 public	 interest	 exemption	
included.	This	means	there	is	no	exception	that	unauthorized	access	or	modification	can	be	
justified	by	 an	overriding	public	 interest	 (Maurushat,	 2014).	 The	only	 absolute	 is	 that	 it	 is	
unsettled	and	vulnerability	disclosure	–	responsible	or	not	–	could	expose	a	discoverer	of	a	
vulnerability	 to	criminal	sanctions	and	civil	 liability	 (Maurushat,	2014).	However,	according	
to	Maurushat	(2014),	“we	must	always	believe	that	the	application	of	law	is	reasonable	and	
that	there	are	many	mitigating	factors	the	legal	system	would	take	into	account”	(p.	51).	In	
Chapter	6,	it	will	be	further	discussed	what	mitigating	factors	can	be	and	how	these	can	be	
shaped.			
Moreover,	the	AIS	Directive	was	an	attempt	of	the	EC	to	harmonize	criminal	codes	related	to	
cybercrime	(Summers,	2015).	There	was	a	broad	consensus	on	the	need	for	harmonization;	
however,	 it	 remains	 questionable	 whether	 harmonization	 is	 possible	 in	 this	 area.	 The	
evaluation	of	the	previous	Framework	Decision	(EU,	2005)	which	has	been	replaced	with	the	
AIS	Directive	 showed	different	 interpretation	 and	 implementation	 among	 the	 20	MS	back	
then	(Summers,	2015).	On	4	September	2017,	the	EC	will	submit	an	evaluation	report	on	the	
implementation	of	 the	AIS	Directive	which	will	 show	whether	 the	AIS	Directive	did	 lead	to	
more	harmonization	of	criminal	codes	related	to	cybercrime	(EU,	2013).	 	Until	 today,	both	
the	CoC	as	the	AIS	Directive	have	thus	not	resulted	in	more	legal	certainty	for	ethical	hackers	
or	 stimulation	 of	 CVD.	MS	 still	 have	 various	 interpretations	 of	 how	 to	 judge	 CVD	 from	 a	
																																																						
14	Often	called	the	Budapest	Convention	on	Cybercrime.		
15	But	has	not	been	ratified	and	entered	into	force	in	all	28	MS:	Ireland	and	Sweden	have	not	yet	done	so	
(www.coe.int).	
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criminal	 law	 viewpoint	 and	 do	 not	 have	 specific	 legislation	 or	 jurisprudence	 that	
demonstrates	how	CVD	is	approached	in	practice	(Biancuzzi,	2008;	ENISA,	2015).		
5.2.2.	EU	CYBERSECURITY	REGULATION	
The	NIS	Directive	(EU,	2016b)	is	the	first	EU-wide	cybersecurity	regulation	(Tauwhare,	2016).	
It	is	based	on	a	form	of	minimum	harmonization	which	leaves	many	details	to	be	decided	on	
by	individual	MS	with	the	accompanying	risk	of	less	impact	(Tauwhare,	2016).	The	Directive	
is	 a	 significant	 step	 forward	 to	 increase	 the	 EU’s	 cyber	 resilience	 and	 construct	 a	 joint	
response	to	cyber	threats	in	the	EU	(Tauwhare,	2016).	The	legal	basis	of	the	NIS	Directive	is	
Art.	 114	 TFEU16	and	 its	 aim	 is	 “achieving	 a	 high	 common	 level	 of	 security	 of	 network	 and	
information	 systems	 within	 the	 Union	 so	 as	 to	 improve	 the	 functioning	 of	 the	 internal	
market”	(EU,	2016,	p.	11).	The	NIS	directive	is	based	on	three	main	pillars	(EU,	2016):		
Ø Guarantee	MS	readiness	by	requiring	equal	baseline	levels	of	security;	
Ø Ensure	cooperation	among	all	MS	by	creating	the:	
o Cooperation	 Group	 to	 facilitate	 strategic	 collaboration	 and	 information	
exchange	among	MS;	
o Computer	 Security	 Incident	 Response	 Team	 (CSIRT)17	Network	 to	 stimulate	
effective	 operational	 coordination	 in	 the	 case	 of	 specific	 cybersecurity	
incidents	and	information	exchange	about	risks;	
Ø Guarantee	a	culture	of	security	across	vital	sectors	by:	
o Introducing	 a	 duty	 of	 care	 for	 operators	 of	 essential	 services	 under	 the	NIS	
Directive	to	take	appropriate	measures;	
o Making	 it	 mandatory	 for	 operators	 of	 essential	 services	 to	 report	 serious	
incidents	to	the	relevant	national	authority.	
It	 is	up	 to	MS	 to	decide	which	organizations	 in	 their	 country	 fall	under	 the	NIS	Directive’s	
definitions	of	operators	of	essential	services	(EU,	2016b).	The	NIS	Directive	also	 introduces	
slightly	 different	 notification	 and	 security	 requirements	 for	 digital	 service	 providers.	 For	
clarity	sake,	 these	will	be	disregarded	because	 it	will	not	change	anything	 for	 the	analysis.		
CVD	 is	 not	 directly	 mentioned	 in	 the	 NIS	 Directive	 but	 could	 be	 a	 useful	 instrument	
																																																						
16	Art.	114	TFEU	is	the	legal	basis	for	EU	action	in	this	area	under	the	denominator	of	harmonization	of	laws	to	
ensure	the	proper	functioning	of	the	internal	market.		
17	The	terms	CSIRT	and	Computer	Emergency	Response	Teams	(CERT)	are	often	used	interchangeably.	A	CSIRT	
is	 “a	 team	 of	 experts	 that	 responds	 to	 computer	 security	 incidents”	 (IGF,	 2014).	 The	 current	 term	 used	 by	
ENISA	 is	 CSIRTs	 because	 it	 better	 underlines	 other	 activities	 CSIRTs	 perform	 nowadays	 on	 top	 of	 solving	
incidents	(ENISA,	2006;	IGF,	2014).	
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supporting	 the	 goal	 of	 the	Directive	 to	 achieve	 a	 common	 level	 of	 cybersecurity	 and	 give	
substance	to	the	duty	of	care	for	operators	of	essential	services.	More	leads	are	(EU,	2016b):	
• Recital	4	emphasizes	the	importance	of	stimulating	a	culture	of	risk	management	and	
the	implementation	of	necessary	security	measures	to	achieve	this;		
• Recital	 44	 states	 that	 responsibilities	 for	 guaranteeing	 network	 security	 lies,	 to	 a	
great	extent,	with	the	operators	of	essential	services	themselves;	
• Article	3	stipulates	that	MS	can	 implement	additional	measures	to	achieve	a	higher	
level	of	security.		
The	options	the	NIS	Directive	provides	for	stimulating	CVD	will	be	discussed	in	Chapter	7.		
5.2.3.	EU	DATA	PROTECTION	REGULATION	
The	GDPR	 (EU,	2016a)	 “lays	down	 rules	 relating	 to	 the	protection	of	natural	persons	with	
regard	 to	 the	 processing	 of	 personal	 data	 and	 rules	 relating	 to	 the	 free	 movement	 of	
personal	data”	(EU,	2016a,	p.	108).	It	is	beyond	the	scope	and	not	relevant	for	this	thesis,	to	
discuss	 this	 261	 pages	 long	 Regulation	 in	 depth.	 Concerning	 CVD,	 one	 element	 is	 of	
particular	importance.	Organizations	in	violation	of	the	GDPR	can	receive	a	fine	up	to	4	%	of	
their	 annual	 global	 turnover	 for	 the	most	 severe	 infringements,	 and	a	 fine	of	2	%	of	 their	
turnover	 if	 they	have	not	 implemented	appropriate	measures	 to	guarantee	the	security	of	
personal	data	(EU,	2016a).	It	is	not	clear	yet	what	will	be	assessed	as	appropriate	measures	
by	 national	 supervisory	 authorities.	 Nevertheless,	 this	 can	 be	 an	 extra	 reason	 for	
organizations	to	 implement	a	CVD	policy	to	stimulate	the	search	for	vulnerabilities	 in	their	
information	systems.	Thereby,	 they	decrease	 the	 risk	of	exploited	or	publically	announced	
vulnerabilities,	 which	 could	 prevent	 organizations	 to	 lose	 data	 and	 possible	 subsequent	
fines.	
5.3.	INTERNATIONAL	NORMS	
It	 is	 important	to	shortly	elaborate	on	the	EU’s	and	 its	MS’	activities	 in	multilateral	 fora	to	
outline	the	international	context	and	relevant	agreements	affecting	the	EU’s	cyber	activities	
and	CVD.	The	CoC	has	already	been	discussed	in	this	Chapter.		
Firstly,	 the	United	Nations	Group	on	Governmental	Experts	 (UN	GGE)	on	Developments	 in	
the	 Field	 of	 Information	 and	 Cyber	 Telecommunications	 in	 the	 Context	 of	 International	
Security	is	an	influential	group	of	25	states18	that	aim	to	build	consensus	on	the	applicability	
																																																						
18	The	list	of	participants	is	secret,	however	in	previous	UN	GGE’s	(2009/2010;	2013/2014)	several	influential	
EU	MS	were	participating	(www.un.org).	
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of	international	law,	norms	of	responsible	state	behavior,	and	confidence	building	measures	
(CBMs)	 in	cyberspace.	The	UN	GGE	has	already	produced	three	reports	(2011,	2013,	2015)	
and	the	discussions	about	a	new	one	in	2016-2017	have	ended	in	a	deadlock	(Segal,	2017).	
The	 reports	 of	 the	 UN	 GGE	 are	 also	 highlighted	 in	 recent	 European	 Council	 Conclusions	
concerning	 cyberdiplomacy	 (European	 Council,	 2015,	 2017).	 	 In	 the	 2015	 report,	 it	 was	
stated	 that	 “states	 should	 encourage	 the	 responsible	 reporting	 of	 ICT	 vulnerabilities”	 (UN	
GGE,	2015,	p.	2)	and	the	following	norm	was	included	on	vulnerability	disclosure	(UN	GGE,	
2015,	pp.	7	–	8):									
	
Secondly,	 the	 Organisation	 for	 Security	 and	 Cooperation	 (OSCE)	 works	 in	 the	 area	 of	
cybersecurity	 mainly	 on	 CBMs.	 CBMs	 are	 practical,	 risk-reduction	 measures	 created	 to	
increase	 transparency	 and	 decrease	 misperception	 and	 escalation	 between	 states	
(Trimintzios	et	 al.,	 2017).	 	 The	OSCE	agreed	on	an	 initial	 set	of	 eleven	CBMs	 in	December	
2013	 (OSCE,	2013)	and	a	 second	 set	of	an	additional	 five	CBMs	on	10	March	2016	 (OSCE,	
2016).	Most	notable,	CBM	16	was	agreed	upon	(OSCE,	2016,	p.	4):		
	 	
Table	3	
UN	GGE	Article	13	
“13.	Taking	into	account	existing	and	emerging	threats,	risks	and	vulnerabilities.	.	.	the	
present	Group	offers	the	following	recommendations	for	consideration	by	States	for	
voluntary,	non-binding	norms,	rules	or	principles	of	responsible	behaviour	of	States	aimed	
at	promoting	an	open,	secure,	stable,	accessible	and	peaceful	ICT	environment:		
	(j)	States	should	encourage	responsible	reporting	of	ICT	vulnerabilities	and	share	
associated	 information	on	available	 remedies	 to	 such	vulnerabilities	 to	 limit	and	
possibly	eliminate	potential	threats	to	ICTs	and	ICT-dependent	infrastructure.”	
Note.	Adapted	from	Report	of	the	Group	of	Governmental	Experts	on	Developments	in	the	Field	of	Information	and	
Telecommunications	in	the	Context	of	International	Security	(pp.	7	-	8),	by	the	United	Group	of	Governmental	Experts,	
2015,	www.un.org	[2017].		
 
Table	4	
OSCE	Confidence-Building	Measure	16	
“Participating	 States	 will,	 on	 a	 voluntary	 basis,	 encourage	 responsible	 reporting	 of	
vulnerabilities	 affecting	 the	 security	 of	 and	 in	 the	 use	 of	 ICTs	 and	 share	 associated	
information	on	available	remedies	to	such	vulnerabilities,	including	with	relevant	segments	
of	the	ICT	business	and	industry,	with	the	goal	of	increasing	co-operation	and	transparency	
within	the	OSCE	region.” 
Note.	Adapted	from	Decision	No.	1202	OSCE	Confidence-Building	Measures	to	reduce	the	risks	of	conflict	stemming	
from	the	use	of	information	and	communication	technologies	(p.	4),	by	the	Organization	for	Security	and	Cooperation,	
2016,	www.osce.org	[2017].		
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The	CBMs	are	 the	 first	 step	 to	normative	development	and	 create	an	environment	where	
more	ambitious	norms	can	be	built	upon	(Trimintzios	et	al.,	2017).	Both	the	norms	agreed	on	
in	the	UN	GGE	and	the	CBMs	in	the	OSCE’s	are	non-binding,	voluntary,	and	act	as	a	point	of	
reference	for	expected	behavior	(Osula	&	Roigas,	2016).	The	EU	and	its	MS	have	committed	
to	implementing	these	norms	and	CBMs,	which	could	be	another	motivation	to	make	work	
of	stimulating	CVD.		
	
5.4.	CONCLUSION	
CVD	or	ethical	hacking	has	until	today	not	been	directly	addressed	by	the	EU	in	its	strategy	
or	regulations.	Nevertheless,	there	are	various	links	under	which	the	EU	could	progress	and	
stimulate	 CVD	 such	 as	 the	 NIS	 Directive	 and	 to	 a	 lesser	 extent	 the	 GDPR	 because	 it	 is	 a	
directly	 applicable	 and	 leaves	 less	 room	 for	 introducing	 clauses	 for	CVD.	Besides	 that,	 the	
agreements	 the	 EU	and	 its	MS	 reached	 in	 international	 fora	 such	 as	 the	UN	GGE	and	 the	
OSCE	 on	 norms	 and	 CBMs	 include	 voluntary	 commitments	 to	 stimulate	 CVD.	 Until	 today,	
there	 has	 been	 little	 visible	 effect	 in	 the	 EU	 and	 its	 MS	 that	 these	 agreements	 changed	
something	in	the	situation	for	ethical	hackers	in	the	EU.	The	previously	described	difficulties	
for	ethical	hackers	 to	 responsibly	disclose	vulnerabilities	 in	 the	EU	are	 thus	not	 solved	yet	
and	thus	there	is	still	room	and	need	for	extra	measures.	
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6. REGULATORY	OPTIONS	FOR	THE	EU	TO	STIMULATE	CVD	
This	Chapter	will	answer	 the	question	whether	stimulating	CVD	to	 increase	 the	EU’s	cyber	
resilience	is	a	task	the	industry	can	and	will	take	up	voluntarily	or	driven	by	concern	for	their	
reputation	or	financial	consequences.	Alternatively,	the	question	will	be	answered	whether	
additional,	more	coercive,	regulation	is	needed	as	a	safeguard.	
Something	 to	 mention	 beforehand	 is	 that	 regulation	 of	 cybersecurity	 is	 not	 easy	 and	
straightforward	 (Carr,	 2016;	 Morgan	 &	 Yeung,	 2007).	 Therefore,	 this	 Chapter	 will	 also	
identify	several	open	questions	for	further	research.	The	analysis	will	follow	the	classification	
of	means	 for	 regulation	of	Morgan	 and	 Yeung	 (2007).	Note	 that	 no	 single	 instrument	will	
provide	 the	 solution,	 but	 a	 right	mix	 of	 instruments	 is	 required	 (Morgan	 &	 Yeung,	 2007;	
Schellekens,	2016).		
6.1.	COMMAND	
Command-and-control	rules	prohibit	behavior	underpinned	with	coercive	sanctions	for	non-
compliance	 (Morgan	&	Yeung,	2007).	The	 focus	will	be	on	the	NIS	Directive	and	the	GDPR	
because	the	CoC	and	AIS	Directive	are	already	 implemented.	There	 is	thus	very	 little	room	
for	maneuver	left	to	change	clauses	to	facilitate	CVD	better.	It	is	not	expected	that	there	will	
soon	 be	 a	 new	 or	 a	 strongly	 adapted	 version	 of	 the	 CoC	 making	 an	 exemption	 for	 CVD	
because	this	will	require	a	new	agreement	between	67	states.	Besides	that,	harmonization	
of	 criminal	 law	 legislation	 concerning	 information	 systems	 is	 challenging.	 It	 is	 grounded	 in	
the	belief	that	the	EU	is	better	suited	to	regulate	such	issues	than	MS	individually	(Summers,	
2015).	Even	if	an	agreement	is	reached	on	what,	and	to	what	extent,	cybercrime	should	be	
criminal,	 questions	pop	up	about	how	much	harmonization	and	whether	harmonization	 is	
even	an	option	(Summers,	2015).		
6.1.1.	REGULATORY	OPTIONS	UNDER	NIS	DIRECTIVE	
The	 NIS	 Directive	 (Art.	 15	 (1);	 Art.	 21)	 and	 the	 GDPR	 (e.g.	 Art.	 84)	 both	 include	 coercive	
sanctions	for	non-compliance.	Both	regulations	set	the	framework,	wherein	other	measures	
can	be	taken	to	better	facilitate	CVD,	without	the	harmonization	of	criminal	law.	Particularly	
the	NIS	Directive	offers	room	to	combine	a	coercive	legal	instrument	with	other	instruments,	
which	will	be	discussed	in	the	following	paragraphs.		
Representatives	of	all	28	MS,	the	EC	and	ENISA	are	currently	discussing	the	implementation	
of	the	NIS	Directive	in	the	newly	established	Cooperation	Group	and	CSIRT	Network.		
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This	gives	the	EU	and	its	MS	a	chance	to	introduce	guidelines	that	stimulate	the	use	of	CVD	
under	the	denominator	of	Article	1	and	14	of	the	NIS	Directive	(EU,	2016b,	pp.	11	-	20):	
	
	
Both	articles	of	the	NIS	Directive	 include	the	need	of	taking	appropriate	security	measures	
and	 are	 norms	 with	 an	 open	 character,	 which	 leaves	 room	 for	 the	 norm	 to	 be	 context	
depended	-	which	is	a	key	characteristic	of	EU	Directives	-	and	not	prescribe	a	specific	level	
of	 security.	 It	 is	 complicated	 to	 specify	 a	 concrete	 level	 of	 cybersecurity	 and	 receive	 the	
information	 to	 enforce	 it.	 Companies	 are	 in	 general	 reluctant	 to	 share	 data	 on	 (failed)	
hacking	attempts	(Schellekens,	2016).	Besides	that,	these	norms	are	relatively	vague	about	
the	amount	of	protection	which	aligns	with	the	idea	that	security	of	information	systems	is	a	
rat	race	between	hackers	and	those	protecting	systems	(Schellekens,	2016).	
The	MS,	 the	 EC	 and	 ENISA	 could	 agree	 in	 the	 Cooperation	 Group	 on	 the	 content	 of	 the	
security	requirements	for	essential	operators.	In	the	Implementing	Decision	laying	down	the	
procedures	of	the	Cooperation	Group	(EC,	2017b),	it	is	stated	that	the	Cooperation	Group	is	
the	committee	for	strategic	cooperation	between	MS	to	share	best	practices	relating	to	the	
Table	5	
NIS	Directive	Article	1	
“1.	 This	Directive	 lays	down	measures	with	a	 view	 to	achieving	a	high	 common	 level	of	
security	 of	 network	 and	 information	 systems	 within	 the	 Union	 so	 as	 to	 improve	 the	
functioning	of	the	internal	market.		
2.	To	that	end,	this	Directive:	
(d)	establishes	security	and	notification	requirements	for	operators	of	essential	services	
and	for	digital	service	providers”	
Note.	Adapted	from	Directive	(EU)	2016/1148	concerning	measures	for	a	high	common	level	of	security	of	network	
and	 information	 systems	 across	 the	 Union	 (p.	 11),	 by	 the	 European	 Parliament	 &	 the	 European	 Council,	 2016,	
www.eur-lex.europa.eu	[2017].			 
	 Table	6	
NIS	Directive	Article	14	
“1)	Member	States	shall	ensure	that	operators	of	essential	services	take	appropriate	and	
proportionate	 technical	 and	 organisational	measures	 to	manage	 the	 risks	 posed	 to	 the	
security	of	network	and	 information	systems	which	 they	use	 in	 their	operations.	Having	
regard	to	the	state	of	the	art,	those	measures	shall	ensure	a	level	of	security	of	network	and	
information	systems	appropriate	to	the	risk	posed.”	
Note.	Adapted	from	Directive	(EU)	2016/1148	concerning	measures	for	a	high	common	level	of	security	of	network	
and	 information	 systems	 across	 the	 Union	 (p.	 20),	 by	 the	 European	 Parliament	 &	 the	 European	 Council,	 2016,	
www.eur-lex.europa.eu	[2017].				
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implementation	of	 the	NIS	Directive.	Moreover,	MS	 in	 collaboration	with	ENISA	 can	assist	
MS	in	building	capacity	to	guarantee	the	security	of	network	and	information	systems.		
The	previously	mentioned	 articles	 give	MS	 the	 room	 to	 implement	measures	 to	 stimulate	
CVD	 in	 the	 EU.	 It	 provides	 options	 for	 the	 EU	 and	 its	 MS	 to	 give	 substance	 to	 the	
international	 voluntary	 norms	 it	 agreed	 upon	 in	 the	 UN	 GGE	 and	 the	 OSCE.	 Under	 the	
command	framework	of	the	NIS	Directive,	 implementing	acts	and	guidelines	could	be	used	
to	harmonize	the	implementation	of	the	NIS	Directive	and	introduce	the	following	measures:		
MANDATORY	IMPLEMENTATION	OF	A	CVD	POLICY	FOR	ESSENTIAL	SERVICE	PROVIDERS	
MS	 or	 the	 EC	 could	 propose	 a	 norm	 in	 the	 Cooperation	 Group	 stating	 that	 all	 essential	
services	 providers	 are	 required	 (or	 recommended)	 to	 have	 a	 CVD	 policy	 in	 place,	 giving	
substance	 to	 the	 requirement	 of	 essential	 services	 providers	 to	 take	 appropriate	 security	
measures.	This	would	be	underpinned	by	the	coercive	sanctions	for	non-compliance	of	the	
NIS	 Directive.	 The	 international	 agreed	 standards	 on	 vulnerability	 disclosure	 from	 the	
International	Standards	Organization	(ISO)	could	be	advocated	for	this,	which	will	be	further	
discussed	later.		
MANDATORY	IMPLEMENTATION	OF	A	CVD	POLICY	FOR	NATIONAL	CSIRTS	
Another	option	would	be	an	agreement	 in	 the	Cooperation	Group,	and	perhaps	 the	CSIRT	
Network,	to	make	it	mandatory	(or	recommended)	for	national	CSIRTs	to	implement	a	CVD	
policy	and	take	a	coordinating	role	in	their	MS	to	support	ethical	hackers	and	vendors	in	CVD	
and	mediate	 if	 necessary.	 This	 could	 be	 one	 of	 the	measures	 to	 ensure	 that	 all	 national	
CSIRTs	have	the	same	security	baseline	 in	 light	of	 the	requirements	of	 the	NIS	Directive.	 If	
every	national	CSIRT	would	have	a	CVD	policy,	 this	would	 increase	 transparency,	decrease	
vulnerabilities	in	information	systems,	reduce	the	chance	of	negative	consequences	of	public	
disclosure,	 and	make	 it	 clearer	 for	 ethical	 hackers	 which	 rules	 they	 need	 to	 follow	when	
reporting	 vulnerabilities.	 Looking	 at	 Annex	 1	 of	 the	 NIS	 Directive	 specifying	 the	 tasks	 of	
national	CSIRTs,	CVD	has	not	directly	been	named.	Although,	cooperation	with	 the	private	
sector	 and	 promotion	 of	 the	 adoption	 of	 standardized	 practices	 for	 incident	 and	 risk-
handling	procedures	are	mentioned.	Moreover,	 the	CSIRT	Network	has	the	power	to	 issue	
guidelines	to	converge	the	services	of	national	CSIRTs	across	Europe.	Growing	cooperation	
between	 CSIRTs	 and	 a	 mandatory	 clause	 for	 CVD	 could	 also	 increase	 the	 position	 of	 an	
ethical	hacker	in	cross-border	cases.	This	coordinating	role	of	CSIRTs	will	be	examined	later.		
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6.1.2.	REGULATORY	OPTIONS	UNDER	GDPR	
Vulnerabilities	 in	 information	 systems	 can	 unwittingly	make	 vendors	 and	 their	 customers	
vulnerable	to	data	breaches	(Fimin,	2016).	If	companies	can	be	fined	for	data	breaches,	this	
will	 provide	 a	 strong	 financial	 incentive	 for	 them	 to	 make	 sure	 as	 little	 as	 possible	
vulnerabilities	are	in	their	information	systems.	The	GDPR	could	thus	indirectly	stimulate	the	
implementation	of	CVD	because	 if	done	responsibly,	 this	can	prevent	a	vulnerability	being	
exploited	or	a	data	breach	from	taking	place,	and	consequently	saving	the	company	a	huge	
amount	of	money.	The	GDPR	with	its	focus	on	consistency,	transparency	and	accountability	
can	become	a	game	changer	 for	CVD,	which	according	 to	 Fimin	 (2016),	has	until	 now	has	
been	based	on	a	random	mix	of	goodwill	and	expedience	to	keep	systems	secure.		
6.1.3.	OTHER	INSTRUMENTS	
INCLUDE	CONCRETE	ACTIVIES	ON	CVD	IN	THE	NEW	EU	CYBERSTATEGY	
There	are	also	other	options	for	the	EU	to	comply	with	its	agreement	to	international	norms	
and	 CBMs	 to	 stimulate	 CVD.	 The	 new	EU	Cybersecurity	 Strategy,	which	 is	 expected	 to	 be	
published	in	September	2017,	could	also	be	a	place	to	underline	the	importance	of	CVD.	A	
task	 could	 be	 included	 for	 the	 EC	 or	 ENISA	 to	 research	 further	 how	 CVD	 could	 be	 better	
facilitated	 in	 the	 EU	 or	 other	 mentioned,	 more	 concrete,	 instruments	 discussed	 in	 this	
Chapter	could	be	included	in	the	strategy.	It	should	be	noted	that	the	introduced	measures	
do	 not	 change	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 is	 illegal,	 but	 could	 make	 it	 more	 transparent	 for	 ethical	
hackers	in	what	cases	governments	or	companies	would	seek	prosecution.	CVD	policy	should	
therefore	 include	 a	 statement	 that	 in	 principle	 the	 government	 or	 company	will	 not	 start	
prosecution	when	the	conditions	are	met.	
	
USE	INSIGHTS	FROM	EU	REGULATION	ON	REPORTING	OF	OCCURENCES	IN	CIVIL	AVIATION	
To	 stimulate	 CVD,	 the	 EU	 could	 also	 use	 insights	 from	 the	 EU	 Regulation	 on	 preventing	
negative	consequences	for	reports	of	vulnerabilities	in	the	aviation	sector	(EU,	2014b).	One	
of	 the	 essential	 elements	 of	 this	 Regulation	 is	 that	 it	 provides	 stricter	 protection	 for	
reporters	and	aims	to	encourage	reporting.	There	are	clauses	in	the	Regulation	that	prevent	
using	the	information	against	the	reporter	but	no	immunity	is	given	to	the	reporter	in	case	
of	gross	negligence,	willful	violations	and	destructive	acts.	Besides	that,	in	Table	7	it	is	stated	
that	national	authorities	should	find	a	balance	between	the	proper	administration	of	justice	
and	the	necessity	of	stimulating	the	reporting	of	safety	risks.		
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The	 EU	 could	 use	 this	 EU	Regulation	 as	 example	 to	 stimulate	 CVD.	 This	 can	 be	 combined	
with	 insights	 of	 the	 public	 prosecution	 guidelines	 on	 CVD	 published	 in	 the	 Netherlands,	
which	will	be	discussed	later.	Such	Regulation	would,	however,	be	depended	on	the	political	
will	of	MS	to	progress	CVD.	As	 is	 the	case	with	most	measures	 introduced	 in	this	Chapter.	
There	 are,	 however,	 hopeful	 signs	 because	 an	 increasing	 number	 of	 MS	 are	 working	 on	
national	 frameworks	to	stimulate	CVD.	Besides	that,	 large-scale	cyber	 incidents	because	of	
vulnerabilities	 in	 information	systems	such	as	WannaCry	and	(Not)Petya	will	possibly	open	
the	debate	on	this	subject	again.		
	
6.2.	COMPETITION	
Competition	instruments	aim	to	change	behavior	by	making	use	of	economic	incentives	and	
the	 competitive	 forces	 of	 the	 market.	 It	 is	 argued	 that	 these	 instruments	 can	 overcome	
many	 flaws	 of	 the	 traditional	 instruments	 of	 command	 (Morgan	 &	 Yeung,	 2007).	
Nevertheless,	 the	 law	 often	 provides	 a	 vital	 facilitative	 role	 to	 create	 the	 framework	 for	
using	competition-based	instruments	(Morgan	&	Yeung,	2007).		
CHARGING	EXPLOITATION	OF	VULNERABILITIES	
Charges	and	taxes	use	a	negative	financial	incentive	not	only	to	change	behavior	but	also	to	
increase	government	revenues	and	correct	misallocations	derivate	of	externalities	(Morgan	
Table	7	
EU	Regulation	on	reporting	of	occurrences	in	civil	aviation:	
Article	15:	Confidentiality	and	appropriate	use	of	information		
“2)	Without	prejudice	to	the	provisions	relating	to	the	protection	of	safety	 information	 in	
Articles	12,	14	and	15	of	Regulation	(EU)	No	996/2010,	information	derived	from	occurrence	
reports	shall	be	used	only	for	the	purpose	for	which	it	has	been	collected.	Member	States,	
the	 Agency	 and	 organisations	 shall	 not	 make	 available	 or	 use	 the	 information	 	 on	
occurrences:		
(a)	in	order	to	attribute	blame	or	liability;	or		
(b)	for	any	purpose	other	than	the	maintenance	or	improvement	of	aviation	safety.	
4)	Member	States	shall	ensure	that	their	competent	authorities	referred	to	in	Article	6(3)	and	
their	 competent	 authorities	 for	 the	 administration	 of	 justice	 cooperate	 with	 each	 other	
through	advance	administrative	arrangements.	These	advance	administrative	arrangements	
shall	 seek	 to	 ensure	 the	 correct	 balance	 between	 the	 need	 for	 proper	 administration	 of	
justice,	on	the	one	hand,	and	the	necessary	continued	availability	of	safety	information,	on	
the	other.”	
 
Note.	Adapted	from	Regulation	(EU)	376/2014	on	the	reporting,	analysis	and	follow-up	of	occurrences	in	civil	
aviation	(p.	35),	by	the	European	Parliament	&	the	European	Council,	2014,	www.eur-lex.europa.eu	[2017].	
 
Strengthening	the	digital	Achilles	heel	of	the	European	Union	
Gijs	Peeters	S1584103	 36	
&	 Yeung,	 2007;	 Ogus,	 1994).	 To	 effectively	 use	 this	 instrument	 there	 should	 be	 a	 clear	
connection	between	the	activity	and	the	harm	caused	which	should	be	measurable	(Morgan	
&	Yeung,	2007).	If	applied	to	CVD,	this	would	mean	there	should	be	a	clear	link	between	the	
responsibility	 of	 a	 company	 for	 an	 exploited	 vulnerability	 to	 a	 measurement	 of	 the	
consequences	 for	 its	 users.	 Most	 certainly,	 the	 industry	 will	 perceive	 charges	 for	 failed	
cybersecurity	as	unjust	–	because	hackers	are	the	cause	–	and	it	will	feel	like	a	punishment	
for	something	they	have	only	limited	control	over	(Schellekens,	2016).	Moreover,	charges	for	
the	lack	of	cybersecurity	are	believed	to	be	counterproductive	because	it	will	only	increase	
the	cybersecurity	costs	and	costs	of	doing	business,	which	will	probably	not	 lead	to	better	
cybersecurity	 and	 fewer	 vulnerabilities	 (Morgan	 &	 Yeung,	 2007).	 Hence,	 charges	 are	 not	
seen	as	particularly	useful	for	stimulating	CVD.		
SUBSIDIES	FOR	CYBERSECURITY	INNOVATION	
A	subsidy	is	a	positive	financial	 incentive	to	reward	desired	behavior	decided	on	by	the	EU	
and	its	MS	(Ogus,	1994).	Subsidies	to	increase	the	cybersecurity	of	information	systems	will	
be	 welcomed	 with	 open	 arms	 by	 businesses	 because	 it	 can	 decrease	 the	 costs	 of	
cybersecurity.	 Nevertheless,	 it	 will	 be	 difficult	 to	 make	 a	 distinction	 between	 companies	
based	 on	 the	 security	 harms	 prevented	 (Schellekens,	 2016).	 If	 a	 company	 shows	 good	
results,	it	could	indicate	that	sufficient	security	measures	have	been	implemented	or	it	is	a	
consequence	of	 no	 interest	 of	 hackers	 to	 target	 the	 information	 systems	of	 this	 company	
(Schellekens,	2016).	Providing	a	direct	EU	subsidy	 for	 the	 implementation	of	CVD	will	 thus	
not	be	a	very	realistic	option.		
There	are,	however,	more	indirect	subsidies	available	stimulating	innovative	research	under	
Horizon	 2020	 (EU,	 2014b)	 for	 companies	 to	 perform	 innovative	 research	 on	 “the	
opportunities	 and	 risks	 of	 information	 security	 markets	 (e.g.	 bug	 bounties,	 vulnerability	
discovery	 &	 disclosure”	 (EC,	 2017c)	 in	 the	 context	 of	 new	 business	 models	 and	 the	
economics	of	cybersecurity.	This	could	possibly	lead	to	innovative	ways	to	stimulate	CVD.	
MAKE	PRODUCT	LIABILITY	RULES	APPLICABLE	TO	THE	PRIVATE	SECTOR		
Governments	can	implement	liability	rules	based	on	the	idea	that	in	the	ideal	situation	users	
know	 exactly	 how	much	 harm	 they	 risk	 from	 using	 a	 product	 and	 what	 the	 costs	 are	 of	
making	 the	 product	 safer	 (Breyer,	 1982).	 The	 latter	 would	 enable	 them	 to	 bargain	 with	
producers	with	as	result	 the	production	of	goods	with	the	right	amount	of	safety	 included	
(Calabresi	&	Melamud,	1972).	Users	ordinarily	do	not	have	this	information	or	are	unable	to	
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understand	it	(Morgan	&	Yeung,	2007).	Cybersecurity	liability	rules	can	be	difficult	to	design	
because	who	is	to	blame:	the	hacker	or	the	company	with	lacking	protection?		
	
The	 EU	product	 liability	 rules	 stemming	 from	1985	are	unfortunately	 not	 going	 to	 answer	
this	question.	In	Article	1	it	is	stated	thay:	“the	producer	shall	be	liable	for	damage	caused	by	
a	defect	 in	his	product”	 (European	Council,	1985,	p.	1).	 In	Article	6	 it	 is	 stipulated	that:	“a	
product	 is	 defective	 when	 it	 does	 not	 provide	 the	 safety	 which	 a	 person	 is	 entitled	 to	
expect”	(European	Council,	1985,	p.	2).	Safety	does	not	have	the	same	meaning	as	security,	
but	 they	 are	 closely	 related.	 A	 security	 vulnerability	 can	 evolve	 into	 a	 safety	 issue	
(Schellekens,	2016).	The	application	of	product	liability	concerning	cybersecurity	raises	many	
questions,	which	go	beyond	the	scope	of	this	thesis.		
Nevertheless,	 some	 important	 remarks	 can	be	made.	 EU	product	 liability	 rules	 are	 largely	
outdated	 and	 do	 not	 cover	 the	 risks	 derivative	 of	 new	 technologies	 (European	 Council,	
1985).	 Therefore,	 the	 EC	 published	 a	 roadmap	 for	 the	 evaluation	 of	 this	 Directive	 and	 to	
assess	whether	it	is	still	‘fit	for	purpose’	and	decide	whether	the	digital	industry	should	fall	
under	 these	 rules	 (EC,	 2016c).	 This	 is	 important	 because	 liability	 rules	 would	 entail	 an	
increase	 in	 the	costs	of	vendors,	which	could	provide	a	 strong	 incentive	 for	 the	vendor	 to	
patch	vulnerabilities	(Cavusoglu	et	al.,	2005).		
In	 the	 current	 situation,	 it	 is	 questionable	 whether	 the	 Directive	 applies	 to	 information	
systems	and	digital	technologies	(BEUC,	2017).	Product	liability	rules	could	thus	be	another	
instrument	which	could	indirectly	encourage	vendors	to	patch	vulnerabilities	and	stimulate	
CVD	policies,	 in	any	case	until	 liability	 rules	apply	 to	 information	systems	 (Cavusoglu	et	al.	
2005).	 However,	 the	 private	 sector	 has,	 in	 general,	 be	 reluctant	 to	 accept	 liability	 when	
referred	 to	 national	 security.	 Private	 companies	 assess	 cybersecurity	 from	 a	 cost-benefit	
perspective	rather	than	from	a	public	good	perspective	(Carr,	2016).	
	
6.3.	CONSENSUS	
Consensus-based	instruments	cover	a	wide	variety	or	regulatory	instruments	with	the	same	
denominator:	they	all	 influence	behavior	by	the	consent	of	its	participants.	The	consensual	
base	can	be	derivative	of	laws	through	which	control	is	exerted	or	based	on	social	consensus	
in	a	community.	 Law	 is	mainly	 facilitating	consensus-based	 instruments	 (Morgan	&	Yeung,	
2007).	All	 forms	 in	 this	Chapter	 combine	 two	 consensus-based	 instruments:	 public-private	
partnerships	(PPP)	and	self-regulation,	which	can	both	be	a	good	step	to	build	trust	and	give	
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companies	 some	 control	 and	 influence.	 For	 the	 government,	 this	 could	 provide	 valuable	
first-hand	information	which	can	be	used	for	new	policies	and	regulations	(Morgan	&	Yeung;	
Schellekens,	 2016).	 There	 is,	 however,	 the	 risk	 of	 regulatory	 capture	 by	 industry.	 An	
excellent	stimulus	to	counter	this,	would	be	a	warning	of	the	government	that	if	they	do	not	
self-regulate,	the	government	will	(Schellekens,	2016).		
6.3.1.	STANDARDIZATION	IN	THE	EU	
According	 to	 the	 EC	 Communication	 on	 ICT	 Standardisation	 Priorities	 for	 the	 DSM:	 “ICT	
standardisation	will	continue	to	be	primarily	 industry-led,	voluntary	and	consensus-driven”	
(EC,	 2016b,	 p.	 4).	 One	 of	 the	 five	 priorities	 areas	 identified	 is	 cybersecurity.	 This	
Communication	 and	 the	 proposed	 actions	 give	 room	 for	 the	 EU	 to	 issue	 standards,	
developed	in	the	PPP	spirit,	to	facilitate	CVD.		
STIMULATING	THE	USE	OF	ISO	STANDARDS	FOR	VULNERABILITY	DISCLOSURE	
Internationally,	 there	 are	 several	 widely	 used	 and	 recommended	 norms	 relating	 to	 CVD,	
most	notably	the	ISO/IEC	standards	(2013,	2014)	and	the	US	National	Institute	of	Standards	
and	 Technology	 (NIST)	 Cybersecurity	 Framework	 (NIST,	 2014).	 These	 standards	 could	 be	
endorsed	by	the	EU	to	give	substance	to	 its	voluntary	commitment	 in	 international	fora	to	
stimulate	 CVD,	 or	 can	 be	 transformed	 to	 the	 EU	 context.	 As	 discussed	 before,	 these	
standards	 can	 become	mandatory	 or	 recommended	 as	 part	 of	 the	 implementing	 acts	 or	
guidelines	 decided	 on	 by	 the	 Cooperation	 Group	 aimed	 at	 harmonization	 of	 the	 security	
requirements	 for	 essential	 services	 providers	 or	 national	 CSIRTs.	 This	 would	 give	MS	 and	
operators	 of	 essential	 services	 grip	 on	 how	 they	 could	 shape	 vulnerability	 handling	 and	
implement	a	CVD	policy.		
	
ISO	and	the	International	Electrotechnical	Commission	(IEC)	make	up	the	specialized	system	
for	worldwide	standardization.	All	national	standardization	bodies	are	also	members	of	ISO	
or	 IEC	and	 contribute	 to	a	wide	variety	of	 standards	 through	 technical	 committees.	 These	
organizations	 are	 non-profit	 and	 open	 for	 technical	 expertise	 from	 governments	 and	
companies	 to	 support	 the	 development	 of	 standards	 (www.iso.org).	 Due	 to	 the	 Vienna	
Agreement	 between	 the	 ISO/IEC	 and	 the	 European	 Committee	 for	 Standardization	 (CEN),	
ISO/IEC	standards	can	be	transposed	to	CEN	standards	and	the	other	way	around	to	avoid	
duplication	of	 standards	 in	 the	world	 (www.cen.eu).	There	are	 two	relevant	 ISO	standards	
relating	to	CVD	and	handling	endorsed	by	CEN	as	shown	in	Figure	2.		
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ISO	 30111	 (ISO,	 2013)	 is	 about	 the	 investigation,	 triage	 and	 resolving	 of	 vulnerabilities,	
independently	 of	 whether	 the	 report	 comes	 from	 an	 external	 party	 or	 the	 own	 security	
testing	teams.	ISO	29147	is	about	implementing	a	CVD	policy	(ISO,	2014).	
There	 is	 no	 need	 to	 reinvent	 the	 wheel.	 The	 EU	 could	 promote	 the	 existing	 industry	
guidelines.	The	above-mentioned	 ISO	standards	are	useful	guidelines	on	how	to	do	handle	
vulnerabilities	 and	 implement	 a	 CVD	 policy	 (Fimin,	 2016;	 NTIA,	 2016).	 According	 to	 Fimin	
(2016),	 it	 is	 essential	 that	 key	 stakeholders	 know	 these	 documents,	 and	 simultaneously,	
governments	and	parts	of	the	industry	itself,	need	to	put	pressure	on	the	industry	to	comply	
with	these	documents	to	improve	CVD	(Fimin,	2016).	However,	currently	only	ISO	29147	is	
freely	available,	while	30111	is	being	updated.	It	remains	to	be	seen	whether	this	standard	
would	become	freely	accessible,	which	would	be	recommendable	to	stimulate	CVD.	The	ISO	
standards	are	complex,	 so	 for	 the	EU,	 it	could	also	be	advantageous	 to	create	a	simplified	
overview	of	the	ISO	standards	to	make	it	clearer	for	governments	and	businesses	what	the	
critical	points	are	for	implementing	a	CVD	policy	(NTIA,	2016).		
	
Figure	2.	Mapping	of	 ISO/IEC	29147	and	 ISO/IEC	30111.	Reprinted	 from	 ISO/IEC	29147	 Information	Technology	–	
Security	Techniques	–	Vulnerability	Disclosure,	by	ISO/IEC,	2014,	www.standards.iso.org	[2017].		
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The	 update	 of	 the	 European	 ICT	 Security	 Certification	 Framework	 by	 September	 2017	
provides	 the	 EU	with	 an	opportunity	 to	 form	or	 implement	 global	 standards	which	would	
help	the	EU	to	achieve	cyber	resilience	(EPSC,	2017).	If	the	EU	would	choose	to	recommend	
international	 agreed	 standards	 for	 national	 CSIRTs	 or	 operators	 of	 essential	 services,	 it	
should	 start	 with	 recommendation	 of	 ISO	 30111	 which	 is	 about	 organizing	 the	 internal	
process	to	handle	and	resolve	vulnerabilities.	The	next	step	would	be	to	stimulate	the	use	of	
ISO	29147	which	concerns	how	to	implement	a	CVD	policy	and	process	external	reports	of	
ethical	 hackers	 but	 before	 this	 can	 be	 implemented	 the	 internal	 process	 needs	 to	 be	 in	
place.		
USE	THE	NIST-FRAMEWORK	TO	STIMULATE	VULNERABILITY	DISCLOSURE	
Another	framework	the	EU	should	consider	is	the	NIST-Framework,	which	has	in	2014	been	
developed	 to	 reduce	 cyber	 risks	 to	 critical	 infrastructures	 in	 the	 US	 as	 a	 response	 to	 the	
Executive	Order	 13636	 ‘Improving	 Critical	 Infrastructure	 Cybersecurity’	 (The	White	House,	
2013).	 The	 NIST-Framework	 is	 a	 voluntary,	 risk-based	 cybersecurity	 standard	 that	 was	
created	 by	 consensus	 among	 thousands	 of	 stakeholders	 from	 government,	 the	 private	
sector	and	academia.	Its	main	aim	is	to	increase	the	cybersecurity	and	resilience	of	the	US,	
but	 it	 has	 been	developed	 considering	 the	 global	 interest	 for	more	 standardization	 and	 is	
thus	also	applicable	outside	the	US	for	public	and	private	organizations	(NIST,	2014;	Wolff	et	
al.,	 2016).	 The	 NIST-Framework	 is	 useful	 because	 it	 creates	 a	 common	 security	 baseline	
which	 can	 be	 tailored	 to	 the	 needs	 of	 various	 stakeholders;	 is	 drawn	 up	 by	 a	 multi-
stakeholder	effort;	and	 is	a	 living	document	which	constantly	evolves	 to	keep	up	with	 the	
changing	 landscape.	 There	 is	 currently	 a	 draft	 update	 of	 the	 NIST-Framework	 under	
discussion	which	would	incorporate	CVD	into	the	Framework	(NIST,	2017).	This	would	help	
organizations	to	evaluate	their	readiness	to	respond	to	reports	of	vulnerabilities	and	explain	
how	 to	 communicate	 with	 internal	 and	 external	 stakeholders	 (NIST,	 2017).	 The	 NIST-
Framework	can	offer	some	guidance	for	the	EU’s	activities	relating	to	CVD.	Another	positive	
point	 of	 using	 insights	 of	 the	 NIST-Framework	 would	 be	 that	 it	 would	 be	 applauded	 by	
industry.	The	industry	would	be	in	favor	of	international	standards	rather	than	EU	standards	
because	 they	 want	 to	 avoid	 the	 costly	 compliance	 with	 hundreds	 of	 varying	 national	
requirements	across	the	world	(Wolff	et	al.,	2016).		International	harmonization	is	thus	key.		
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6.3.2.	INDUSTRY	SELF-REGULATION	
	
SELF-REGULATION	BY	THE	INDUSTRY:	AGREEING	ON	NORMS	
Companies	themselves	are	also	active	in	promoting	CVD.	Microsoft,	for	example,	is	for	some	
time	 now	 calling	 for	 norms	 for	 CVD	 to	 mitigate	 risks	 of	 exploitation	 of	 vulnerabilities	 in	
information	systems	(Charney	et	al.,	2016).	 In	Table	8	and	9	the	norms	that	Charney	et	al.	
(2016)	 introduced	are	displayed	which	 could	give	 some	directions	 for	norms	 the	EU	could	
adopt.		
	
	
Microsoft	calls	upon	the	private	sector	to	implement	policies	to	facilitate	CVD	and	increase	
transparency	 about	 how	 companies	 deal	 with	 this	 (Charney	 et	 al.,	 2016).	 They	 should	
motivate	governments	 to	do	 the	 same	 (Nicholas	et	al.,	2014).	 If	properly	done,	all	players	
will	 in	 the	 end	 profit	 when	 security	 and	 resilience	 increase	 due	 to	 the	 handling	 of	
vulnerability	reporting	in	a	coordinated	way	(Nicholas	et	al.,	2014).	
SELF-REGULATION	BY	THE	INDUSTRY:	ETHICAL	CODES	
Self-regulation	through	ethical	codes	could	also	create	an	ecosystem	wherein	ethical	hackers	
can	responsibly	disclose	vulnerabilities	to	strengthen	information	systems.	Ethical	codes	can	
help	with	 clearly	 differentiating	 the	 activities	 of	 ethical	 hackers	 and	 black	 hats	 and	 could	
increase	the	trust	of	government	and	companies	in	ethical	hackers.	There	is	much	literature	
about	 ethical	 codes	 for	 ethical	 hackers19.	 Although,	 there	 is	 no	 accepted	 European	 or	
international	ethical	 code	which	 is	widely	used	 (Kirwan	&	Power,	2012;	Matwyshyn	et	al.,	
																																																						
19	See	ethics.acm.org	for	an	industry	best	practice;	Matwyshyn	et	al.	(2010)	for	a	historical	overview	of	ethical	
codes;	and	Kirwan	&	Power	(2012)	for	an	overview	of	the	current	debate	about	ethical	codes.	
Table	8	
Vulnerability	disclosure	norm	for	nations	
“States	 should	 have	 a	 clear,	 principle-based	 policy	 for	 handling	 product	 and	 service	
vulnerabilities	 that	 reflects	a	 strong	mandate	 to	 report	 them	 to	vendors,	 rather	 than	 to	
stockpile,	buy,	sell,	or	exploit	them	for	nation	states.”	
Note.	Adapted	from	From	Articulation	to	Implementation:	Enabling	progress	on	cybersecurity	norms	(p.	7),	by	S.	
Charney	et	al.,	2016,	Microsoft,	www.microsoft.com	[2017].  
 
Table	9	
Vulnerability	disclosure	norm	for	the	global	ICT	industry	
“Global	ICT	companies	should	adhere	to	coordinated	disclosure	practices	for	handling	of	ICT	
product	and	service	vulnerabilities.”	
Note.	Adapted	from	From	Articulation	to	Implementation:	Enabling	progress	on	cybersecurity	norms	(p.	7),	by	S.	
Charney	et	al.,	2016,	Microsoft,	www.microsoft.com	[2017].	 
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2010).	 Besides	 that,	 there	 are	 no	 empirical	 studies	 that	 analyzed	whether	 ethical	 hackers	
subscribe	to	the	ethics	of	such	codes	(Kirwan	&	Power,	2012).		
According	to	Matwyshyn	et	al.	(2010),	the	most	essential	and	basic	ethic	is	the	duty	not	to	
harm	(Matwyshyn	et	al.,	2010).	However,	critics	state	that	vulnerability	research	is	in	its	core	
unethical	 because	 it	 includes	 testing	 systems	 of	 someone	 other	 than	 the	 ethical	 hacker	
(Schneier	&	Ranum,	2008).	On	the	contrary,	a	strong	argument	can	be	made	that	at	least	a	
part	of	vulnerability	research	is	ethical	and,	even	ethically	desirable.	Provided	that	systems	
will	 not	 be	 disrupted,	 nothing	will	 be	 damaged	or	 in	 any	 other	way	 harm	 third	 parties,	 it	
seems	the	duty	not	to	harm	is	achieved	(Matwyshyn	et	al.,	2010).	On	top	of	that,	the	aim	of	
CVD	 is	 not	 to	 harm	 someone	 but	 to	 prevent	 people	 from	 being	 harmed	 by	 an	 exploited	
vulnerability	 (Matwyshyn	 et	 al.,	 2010).	 As	 an	 example,	 the	 Hacker’s	 Aegis	 suggest	 the	
following	rules	ethical	hackers	should	comply	with	not	to	be	prosecuted	(Baumbauer	&	Day,	
2010):	
	
If	 ethical	 hackers	 follow	 these	 rules,	 their	 activities	 should	 be	 lawful,	 according	 to	
Baumbauer	 &	 Day	 (201).	 Not	 complying	 with	 these	 rules	 will	 remove	 the	 possibility	 for	
immunity	and	the	vendor	should	use	facts	to	show	that	the	ethical	hacker	has	broken	one	of	
these	rules	(Baumbauer	&	Day,	2010).	Ethical	hackers	could	register	to	such	ethical	codes	of	
among	 others,	 associations	 or	 these	 codes	 could	 be	 used	 as	 input	 for	 the	 conditions	 for	
responsible	behavior	in	CVD	policies.	
	
Table	10	
Ethical	code	for	ethical	hackers	
1) Tell	the	vendor	first	before	publishing	when	discovering	a	vulnerability	and	postpone	reporting	
to	give	the	vendor	the	time	to	review	the	information,	contact	the	ethical	hacker,	and	create	a	
patch	if	necessary;	
2) Do	not	sell	or	offer	the	vulnerability	information	for	sale	to	third	parties;	
3) Test	 on	 your	 own	 system	 if	 possible,	 if	 it	 is	 not	 reasonable	 possible,	 for	 example	with	 cloud	
computing,	it	would	be	allowed	to	make	use	of	others’	systems	lightly;	
4) Do	not	weaponize.	 The	discoverer	 should	not	publish,	without	 the	vendor’s	authorization,	an	
exploit	or	proof	of	concept	code	that	makes	it	possible	to	attack	against	the	vulnerability.	This	
would	weaponize	vulnerabilities	and	increase	the	amount	of	potential	attacks.		
5) Create	a	trail	for	the	vulnerability	by	giving	inter	alia	a	detailed	description	of	the	vulnerability,	
how	it	can	be	exploited.	
Note.	Based	on	information	from	“Hacker’s	Aegis”	(p.	34	–	40),	D.	E.	Baumbauer	&	O.	Day,	2010,	Emory	Law	Journal,	
60,	pp.	1-51.			
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6.3.3.	BEST	PRACTICES	
STIMULATE	CSIRTS	TO	BECOME	VULNERABILITY	DISCLOSURE	COORDINATING	CENTERS	
Many	actors	are	not	able	to	resolve	cybersecurity	threats	alone.	Simultaneously,	there	 is	a	
public	 interest	 to	 share	 information	 about	 vulnerabilities.	New	exploits	 and	 vulnerabilities	
found	by	ethical	hackers	or	companies	need	to	be	shared	with	other	relevant	stakeholders	
as	 quickly	 as	 possible	 (ENISA,	 2015;	 Schellekens,	 2016).	 The	 problem	 with	 information	
sharing	 is	 that	 for	 most	 companies	 this	 information	 is	 commercially	 sensitive:	 it	 entails	
information	on	attempted	or	succeeded	hacks	or	exploits.	Organizations	will	only	share	this	
information	 if	 there	 is	 a	 stable	 base	 of	 trust	 among	 stakeholders	 and	 clear	 conditions	 for	
sharing	are	in	place	(Schellekens,	2016).	Furthermore,	knowledge	of	vulnerabilities	and	way	
to	 solve	 them	 need	 to	 be	 communicated	 quickly	 and	 adequately	 among	 the	 relevant	
stakeholders	 (ENISA,	 2015).	 Therefore,	 a	 coordinating	 authority	 for	 CVD	 would	 be	
recommendable	because	it	can	(ENISA,	2015;	Schellekens,	2016):	
Ø Distribute	 vulnerability	 information	 and	 solutions	 across	 borders	 and	 sectors	
preventing	harm	and	unnecessary	exposure	to	risks;	
Ø Mediate	 between	 vendors	 and	 ethical	 hackers	 in	 case	 of	 misunderstandings	 or	
problems	 in	 the	 communication	 preventing	 uncontrolled	 publication	 of	
vulnerabilities	(see	Figure	3);		
Ø Overcome	 the	 significant	 difference	 in	 power	 between	 big	 vendors	 and	 a	 single	
ethical	hacker	to	ensure	the	prospects	of	a	timely	reaction	of	a	vendor;		
Ø Limit	the	legal	exposure	of	the	ethical	hacker.	
A	well-placed	organization	to	take	up	this	neutral	third	party	coordinating	role	is	a	national	
CSIRT	(Schellekens,	2016).	The	EU	could	learn	from	CSIRTs	with	much	experience	with	CVD	
already,	notably	CERT-CC	in	the	US,	JP-CERT	in	Japan,	CERT-FI	in	Finland	and	the	NCSC	in	the	
Netherlands	(ENISA,	2015).	ENISA,	the	EU,	and	its	MS	could	stimulate	the	use	of	CVD	policies	
and	national	CSIRTs	to	take	up	roles	in	a	coordinating	role	in	the	CVD	process.		
	
	
	
Figure	3.	Responsible	disclosure	/	coordinated	vulnerability	disclosure	process	including	mediation	by	coordinator.		
 
Discovery	of	
vulnerabilty
Contact	
coordinator	
(CSIRT)
Contact	vendor
Make	
responsibly	
public
Strengthening	the	digital	Achilles	heel	of	the	European	Union	
Gijs	Peeters	S1584103	 44	
It	could	furthermore	be	recommended	to	look	at	the	multi-stakeholder	process	of	the	NTIA	
and	the	Forum	of	Incident	Response	and	Security	Teams	(FIRST)	which	discuss	and	issue	CVD	
policies,	handling	practices	and	best	practices	(NTIA,	2016;	FIRST,	2016).	 In	both	initiatives,	
EU	 MS	 were	 also	 involved,	 and	 these	 best	 practices	 can	 provide	 input	 for	 EU	 action	 to	
stimulate	CVD.		
6.4.	COMMUNICATION	
Communication	instruments	try	to	effect	behavior	by	enriching	the	information	available	to	
those	 whose	 behavior	 should	 change	 (e.g.	 governments,	 vendors,	 ethical	 hackers).	
Communication	 can	 be	 built	 upon	 law	 or	 be	 of	 a	 non-coercive	 nature	 (Morgan	&	 Yeung,	
2007).	
CREATING	BUG	BOUNTY	PLATFORMS	AND	PROGRAMS	
Communication	is	of	vital	importance	to	better	inform	users.	Next	to	mandatory	reporting,	
the	 private	 sector	 can	 also	 communicate	 voluntarily	 about	 cybersecurity	 to	 underline	 the	
quality	and	security	of	their	products	(Morgan	&	Yeung,	2007).	A	legal	option	can	be	through	
so-called	bug	bounty	platforms	where	a	cash	reward	is	offered	by	a	vendor	in	exchange	for	
vulnerability	 information	 (Maurushat,	 2014;	 McGraw,	 2017;	 Sutton	 &	 Nagle,	 2006).	
Especially	zero-days20	are	very	profitable.		
Most	vendors	or	governments	do	not	compensate	ethical	hackers	with	money	 if	 they	 find	
vulnerabilities	 in	 their	products.	 In	 the	case	of	CVD,	 the	rewards	are	often	smaller	such	as	
acknowledgment	in	a	hall	of	fame,	‘hacker’s	t-shirts’,	or	vouchers.	The	underlying	idea	of	a	
bug	bounty	program	is	not	to	display	that	hackers	cannot	enter	the	system.	It	is	grounded	in	
the	belief	that	the	most	secure	systems	are	those	that	have	been	exposed	to	much	testing	
(Schellekens,	 2016).	 In	 general,	 bug	 bounty	 programs	make	 vulnerability	 disclosure	 more	
transparent	 and	 structured.	 It	 also	 gives	 both	 parties	 a	 reward	 instead	 of	 one,	which	 is	 a	
positive	incentive	for	more	effective	cooperation.	There	is,	however,	still	some	reluctance	in	
accepting	bug	bounty	platforms	and	giving	financial	rewards	for	vulnerabilities.	Particularly	
from	 a	 government	 perspective	 because	 they	 are	 afraid	 of	 possible	 blackmail,	 do	 not	
support	 the	 idea	of	competition	 for	vulnerability	 information	or	have	 the	altruistic	believe	
that	this	information	should	be	free	(ENISA,	2015;	Sutton	&	Nagle,	2006).		
																																																						
20	“A	zero-day	vulnerability	is	a	vulnerability	for	which	no	patch	is	available	yet	because	the	developer	of	the	
vulnerable	software	has	not	yet	had	time	to	make	a	patch”	(NCSC,	2016).	
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Furthermore,	 some	 governments	 are	 in	 the	 business	 of	 buying	 vulnerabilities,	 mainly	
intelligence	 agencies,	 for	 defensive	 and	 offensive	 actions	 to	 protect	 the	 national	 security	
(Ellis,	 2015).	 This	 is	 a	 worrisome	 development	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 a	 resilient	 EU	 in	
cyberspace	because	vulnerability	information	is	kept	secret	by	various	parties,	which	leaves	
vulnerabilities	 unsolved	 and	 other	 actors	 vulnerable	 (ENISA,	 2015;	 Sutton	&	Nagle,	 2006).	
This	debate	is	however	to	extensive	and	outside	the	scope	of	this	thesis.		
The	EU	and	it	MS	should	nevertheless	closely	follow	the	results	of	the	EP	program	approved	
in	December	2016	on	open	software	which	 introduces	a	bug	bounty	program	to	stimulate	
the	search	for	vulnerabilities	in	free	software	of	the	EU	institutions	to	prevent	compromise	
of	EU	institutions	systems	(Schaake,	2016).	It	could	also	be	interesting	to	keep	a	close	eye	on	
a	bug	bounty	pilot	program	in	the	US,	which	is	agreed	on	with	the	‘Hack	DHS	Act’	to	increase	
cybersecurity	of	 the	systems	of	 the	Department	of	Homeland	Security	 (DHS).	According	 to	
the	Act,	the	DHS	Secretary	needs	to	cooperate	with	the	Attorney	General	to	guarantee	that	
these	ethical	hackers	do	not	 face	prosecutions	 for	activities	 falling	within	 the	scope	of	 the	
program	 (Hassan,	 2017).	 Besides	 that,	 there	 are	 also	 lessons	 the	 EU	 can	 learn	 from	 the	
concluded	 initiative	 ‘Hack	 the	 Pentagon’,	 wherein	 ethical	 hackers	 were	 invited	 to	 find	
vulnerabilities	in	systems	of	the	Pentagon	(Collins,	2016).	
USE	EXPERIENCES	FROM	THE	JUST	CULTURE	INITIATIVE	AND	THE	CVD	MANIFESTO	
On	1	October	2015,	the	PPP-initiative	‘Just	Culture’	was	signed	by	the	European	air	industry,	
in	 cooperation	with	 the	 EU,	 to	make	 the	 aviation	 sector	 safer.	 The	 signatories	 commit	 to	
creating	 an	 environment	 of	 trust	 where	 staff	 has	 the	 confidence	 to	 report	 safety	
vulnerabilities,	 even	 when	 they	 have	 made	 honest	 mistakes	 (www.aviationreporting.eu).	
This	 Just	 Culture	Declaration	 is	 comparable	with	 the	 ‘Coordinated	Vulnerability	Disclosure	
Manifesto’	which	was	launched	during	the	Netherlands’	Presidency	of	the	EU	by	29	private	
organizations	 in	 cooperation	 with	 the	 NCSC	 (CIO	 Platform,	 2016a,	 2016b).	 Signatories	 of	
these	documents,	acknowledge	the	importance	of	responsible	reporting	of	safety	or	security	
vulnerabilities.	In	case	of	the	latter,	these	organizations	publicly	announced	their	support	for	
CVD.	Both	are	good	examples	of	combining	consensus-	and	competition-based	instruments	
to	stimulate	a	change	of	behavior.	Moreover,	both	declarations	are	non-legally	binding	and	
do	 not	 intend	 to	 overrule	 judicial	 rules	 of	 MS	 (www.aviationreporting.eu;	 CIO	 Platform,	
2016).			
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START	A	PUBLIC	CAMPAIGN	TO	STIMULATE	CVD	
The	 EU	 could	 use	 the	 same	 elements	 as	 used	 in	 the	 public	 campaign	 to	 promote	 a	 Just	
Culture	in	the	aviation	sector	to	stimulate	CVD	(see	Figure	4).	It	 is	a	way	of	educating	both	
vendors	 as	 well	 as	 ethical	 hackers	 about	 the	 criteria	 they	 should	 follow	 when	 finding	 a	
vulnerability,	 expressing	 the	 boundaries	 of	 responsible	 disclosing	 vulnerabilities	 and	 good	
conduct.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
STIMULATE	THE	USE	OF	CVD	POLICIES	
Another	 example	 of	 using	 communication	 as	 an	 instrument	 is	 the	 guideline	 to	 boost	
responsible	disclosure	published	by	the	NCSC	in	January	2013	drafted	up	in	cooperation	with	
the	private	sector	and	academics	(NCSC,	2013).	It	gives	organizations	several	building	blocks	
to	construct	their	CVD	policy.	Such	policy,	can	by	way	of	communication	give	the	discoverer	
“sufficient	reassurance	with	regards	to	 legal	 issues,	such	as	protection	from	legal	actions	 if	
the	reporting	by	the	discoverer	is	compliant	with	the	CVD	policy”	(van	der	Meulen,	2016,	p.	
8).	
PUBLISH	PROSECUTION	GUIDELINES	AND	CREATING	AN	OVERVIEW	OF	JURISPRUDENCE	
As	a	 reaction	 to	 these	guidelines,	 the	Dutch	Public	Prosecutor	 (DPP)	 sent	a	 letter	 to	all	 its	
departments	 communicating	 how	 a	 CVD	policy	 should	 play	 a	 role	 to	 decide	 if	 to	 proceed	
with	a	prosecution	of	hacking	on	a	case	by	case	base	(Openbaar	Ministerie,	2013,	p.	3).	
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Figure	4.	Overview	of	documents	used	 for	 the	public	 campaign	promoting	 reporting	occurrences	 in	 the	aviation	
sector.	Reprinted	from	www.aviationreporting.eu	[2017].		
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In	short:	 if	someone	finds	a	vulnerability	 in	the	Netherlands	and	this	right	away	reports	to	
the	owner	of	the	information	system,	this	would	most	likely	be	seen	as	ethical	hacking.	But	if	
this	 person	 did	 go	 further	 than	 this	 (copy,	 manipulate	 or	 delete	 data),	 a	 criminal	
investigation	 can	 be	 opened.	 The	 guideline	 of	 the	 NCSC	 does	 not	 provide	 ethical	 hackers	
with	 legal	certainty	because	hacking	can	always	be	 investigated	and	prosecuted	under	 the	
Dutch	Penal	Code.	Nevertheless,	 the	 letter	of	 the	DPP	does	show	that	 they	have	seriously	
thought	about	this	issue	and	provides	ethical	hackers	with	some	directions	about	how	they	
should	responsibly	disclose	vulnerabilities	without	risking	prosecution.		
The	 annual	 Cyber	 Security	 Assessments	 of	 the	 NCSC	 show	 that	 an	 increasing	 number	 of	
Dutch	 companies	 have	 implemented	 CVD	 policies	 and	 the	 number	 of	 reports	 of	 ethical	
hackers	 is	 also	 growing	 (NCSC,	 2015b,	 2016).	 These	 are	 hopeful	 signs	 that	 the	 Dutch	
approach	has	given	ethical	hackers	a	certain	degree	of	confidence.	Until	now,	the	DPP	has	
prosecuted	two	cases	that	provide	more	direction	about	the	boundaries	that	apply	to	CVD	
and	 ethical	 hacking21	(van	 ‘t	 Hof,	 2015).	 According	 to	 van	 der	Meulen	 (2015),	 this	 can	 be	
seen	as	a	growing	trust	between	the	governments,	vendors	and	ethical	hackers.	
	
																																																						
21	Rechtbank	Den	Haag	(2014)	&	Rechtbank	Oost-Brabant	(2013).	In	both	cases,	they	did	not	responsibly	
disclose	a	vulnerability,	although	they	tried	to	argue	that	it	was	about	CVD.		
	
Table	11	
Letter	Dutch	Public	Prosecutor	on	Responsible	Disclosure	
“In	short:	when	assessing	the	question	whether	or	not	criminal	acts	were	committed,	the	
Public	Prosecutor	will	have	to	take	the	following	circumstances	into	account:	
Ø Was	the	conduct	of	the	suspect	necessary	within	the	context	of	a	democratic	society	(i.e.	was	
there	an	important	general	interest)?	
Ø Was	the	conduct	of	the	suspect	proportionate	(were	his	means	proportionate	in	relation	to	
the	goal	he	wanted	to	achieve)?	In	other	words:	how	did	the	hacker	get	access	to	the	ICT	
system?	If	for	this	purpose	he	acted	disproportionately,	e.g.	as	described	in	the	Guidelines	on	
page	8	under	4.2.,	one	cannot	speak	of	an	‘ethical’	hack.	
Ø Did	the	suspect	act	alternatively	(were	there	other	ways	to	act)?	In	other	words:	was	the	hack	
immediately	reported	to	the	owner	of	the	ICT	system	or	did	the	hacker	not	do	so	in	order	to	
be	able	to	delete	traces,	to	manipulate,	copy	or	delete	data?	If	traces	were	deleted	and	data	
were	manipulated,	copied	or	deleted,	it	was	not	an	ethical	hack.	
If	the	answer	to	the	above	questions	is	positive,	the	Public	Prosecutor	may	refrain	from	
conducting	a	criminal	investigation	or	from	initiating	criminal	proceedings.”	
Note.	Adapted	from	Responsible	Disclosure	(how	to	act	in	cases	of	‘ethical’	hackers?)	(p.	3),	by	Openbaar	Ministerie,	
2013,	www.om.nl	[2017].	 
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As	mentioned	before,	creating	legal	certainty	in	the	EU	landscape	with	a	wide	variety	of	laws	
is	 difficult	 to	 accomplish	 soon.	 Hence,	 ENISA	 already	 recommended	 in	 2013	 after	 the	
adoption	of	the	AIS	Directive	that	it	would	be	recommended	for	MS	to	publish	guidance	on	
“the	interpretation	and	application	of	the	unlawful	access	provisions,	and	particularly	on	the	
element	of	intent	(i.e.	the	unlawfulness	–	without	right)	in	cases	where	no	security	measures	
were	breached,	if	this	is	permitted	under	national	law”	(Muynck,	Graux	&	Robinson,	2013).	
ENISA	reiterated	the	need	for	large-scale	implementation	of	CVD	in	a	report	of	2015	on	CVD.	
Options	would	be	to	create	prosecution	guidelines	that	permit	CVD	under	certain	conditions	
or	 issue	 overviews	 of	 jurisprudence	 to	 demonstrate	 how	 courts	 apply	 the	 law	 in	 practice	
(Muynck	et	al.,	2013).	The	collection	and	distribution	of	such	good	practices	at	the	EU	level	
can	 also	 support	 the	 homogenous	 application	 of	 the	 law	 regarding	 hacking	 across	 the	 EU	
(Muynck	 et	 al.,	 2013).	 All	 these	 measures	 will	 make	 the	 process	 and	 possible	 legal	
consequences	more	predictable	for	ethical	hackers.	As	a	result,	the	trust	between	all	actors	
will	increase	and,	therefore,	positively	affect	CVD	and	the	cyber	resilience	of	the	EU	(ENISA,	
2015;	van	der	Meulen,	2016).	
6.5.	CONCLUSION	
The	question	whether	the	EU	could	leave	stimulating	CVD	to	the	industry	itself	is	difficult	to	
answer.	A	combination	of	instruments	that	stimulate	both	governments	as	the	private	sector	
would	be	recommended.		
Command	measures	are	suitable	to	set	the	framework,	particularly	the	NIS	Directive	and	the	
GDPR	provide	links	to	take	measures	to	stimulate	CVD	underpinned	by	a	coercive	sanction	
for	 non-compliance.	 Other	 instruments	 should	 be	 used	 to	 build	 upon	 the	 framework’s	
clauses	 to	 take	 appropriate	 security	measures	 and	 give	 substance	 to	 the	 duty	 of	 care	 for	
essential	 service	 providers.	 Specifically,	 because	 close	 cooperation	 between	 public	 and	
private	organizations	 is	advocated	 to	effectively	 regulate	cybersecurity	and	stimulate	CVD.	
Competition-based	 measures	 such	 as	 subsidies	 and	 product	 liabilities	 could	 be	 used	 to	
stimulate	CVD.	Although	subsidies	 can	only	be	used	 indirectly	 to	 stimulate	 research	about	
how	CVD	 could	 be	 better	 facilitated	 in	 the	 EU.	 It	 is	 not	 clear	what	 the	 effects	 of	 product	
liability	 rules	 would	 be	 on	 CVD.	Moreover,	 the	 industry	 is	 in	 general	 reluctant	 to	 accept	
liability	measures	 from	the	perspective	of	national	security.	Charges	and	sanctions	are	not	
seen	as	desirable	and	useful	to	stimulate	CVD.		
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Furthermore,	 consensus	 and	 communication-based	 instruments	 are	 considered	 the	 most	
suitable	 instruments	 to	 build	 upon	 frameworks	 provided	 by	 command	 instruments.	
Consensus-based	instruments	are	valuable	to	unite	the	public	and	private	interests.	The	EU	
could	 make	 use	 of	 international	 standards	 and	 industry	 best	 practices	 to	 shape	 its	 own	
guidelines	 or	 norms	 to	 stimulate	 CVD,	 to	 give	 substance	 to	 the	 duty	 of	 care	 of	 the	 NIS	
Directive	or	a	new	EU	Cyberstrategy.	Lastly,	most	introduced	instruments	are	hybrids	and	to	
some	extent	use	the	power	of	communication	to	change	behavior.	The	EU	could	use	insights	
of	 the	 Just	Culture	 initiative	 in	 the	aviation	sector,	experiences	with	bug	bounty	programs	
and	 Dutch	 best	 practices	 such	 as	 the	 guideline	 on	 how	 to	 implement	 a	 CVD	 policy	 for	
companies	and	the	DPP’s	letter	explaining	which	circumstances	the	DPP	will	consider	when	
assessing	whether	an	ethical	hacker	has	committed	a	crime.		
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7. CONCLUSIONS	&	DISCUSSION	
This	 thesis	 examined	 how	 the	 EU	 could	 use	 regulatory	 instruments	 to	 increase	 its	 cyber	
resilience	through	stimulating	coordinated	vulnerability	disclosure.		
First	 of	 all,	 when	 hackers	 or	 other	malicious	 actors	 check	 out	 the	 security	 of	 information	
systems,	 they	 are	 looking	 for	 any	 chink	 in	 one’s	 armor	 to	 infiltrate	 the	 system.	 Security	
experts	 say	 everything	 can	 be	 hacked;	 it	 is	 just	 a	matter	 of	 time	 and	 resources.	 For	 that	
reason,	vulnerabilities	have	always	been	the	digital	Achilles	heel	of	information	systems.	Not	
only	 in	 the	EU,	but	all	over	 the	world,	as	underlined	by	 ransomware	campaigns	exploiting	
vulnerabilities	such	as	WannaCry	and	(Not)Petya.	
Identifying	 and	 solving	 vulnerabilities	 is	 therefore	 critical.	 A	 vital	 measure	 to	 do	 so	 is	
stimulating	 CVD.	 Currently,	 ethical	 hackers	 risk	 being	 sued	 because	 searching	 for	
vulnerabilities	 without	 consent	 of	 the	 system’s	 owners	 is	 illegal	 in	 all	 MS.	 Consequently,	
ethical	 hackers	 can	 be	 persuaded	 to	 sell	 vulnerabilities	 on	 the	 black	 market,	 exploit	 the	
vulnerability	themselves	or	make	it	public	for	others	to	exploit.	It	is	of	importance	for	the	EU	
to	come	up	with	measures	to	stimulate	CVD,	so	ethical	hackers,	vendors	and	governments	
will	work	together	to	make	information	systems	more	secure,	protect	the	users	and	prevent	
negative	consequences	of	vulnerabilities.		
The	 analysis	 demonstrates	 that	 some	 form	 of	 regulation	 is	 needed	 as	 current	 legislation	
does	 not	 address	 this	 security	 issue	 at	 all.	 Policymakers	 in	 the	 EU	 should	 embrace	 the	
services	 of	 ethical	 hackers	 because	 of	 its	 significant	 benefits.	 There	 is	 a	 need	 to	 proper	
facilitate	CVD,	instead	of	inappropriately	obstruct	it.		
In	the	EU,	stimulating	CVD	is	also	depended	on	political	will.	The	momentum	to	address	this	
issue	 is	 present.	 Many	 MS	 are	 currently	 working	 on	 creating	 national	 frameworks	 to	
stimulate	 CVD,	 while	 at	 the	 same	 time	 large-scale	 cyber	 incidents	 have	 become	 less	
hypothetical	and	more	tangible	due	to	WannaCry	and	(Not)Petya.	Subsequent	statements	of	
the	 EC	 and	MS	 point	 to	 a	 realization	 that	 vulnerabilities	 in	 information	 systems	must	 be	
addressed	 on	 the	 EU	 level.	 Meanwhile,	 discussions	 concerning	 cybersecurity	 are	 ongoing	
because	 a	 new	 EU	 Cyberstrategy	 will	 be	 issued	 in	 September	 2017	 and	 the	 Cooperation	
Group	and	the	CSIRT	Network	are	still	discussing	the	implementation	of	the	NIS	Directive.		
When	looking	at	the	EU’s	aim	to	become	cyber	resilient,	 it	 is	essential	that	the	EU	has	the	
capability	to	absorb	and	recover	from	cyber	incidents	quickly.	Due	to	the	rapid	technologic	
developments,	 ever-changing	 threat	 landscape,	 the	 rat-race	 in	 cyberspace	 and	 the	 lack	 of	
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borders,	it	is	important	that	the	EU	has	flexible	mechanisms	in	place	to	ensure	the	security	
of	the	EU.	To	achieve	this,	the	EU	should	increasingly	create	flexible	and	adaptive	structures	
based	 on	 self-organization,	 multi-stakeholderism	 and	 public-private	 cooperation.	
Regulations	should	not	be	developed	top-down	but	rather	bottom-up.	By	doing	so,	the	EU	
will	best	be	able	to	counter	cyber	threats,	and	will	not	only	deal	with	the	symptoms	but	also	
address	the	root	causes.		
Consequently,	 command	 rules	 are	 suitable	 to	 set	 the	 framework	 for	 action	 but	 are	 not	
sufficiently	flexible	to	quickly	adapt	to	changing	circumstances	and	do	not	make	enough	use	
of	 the	 power	 of	 partnerships.	 The	 NIS	 and	 GDPR	 do	 in	 contrast	 create	 a	 framework	
underpinned	 by	 sanctions	 for	 non-compliance.	 Consensus	 and	 communication-based	
measures	should	be	introduced	using	the	expertise	of	the	private	sector	to	extend	this	legal	
framework.	 Until	 now,	 it	 seems	 the	 industry	 has	 stimulated	 CVD	 in	 dribs	 and	 drabs.	
Therefore,	a	somewhat	stronger	direction	provided	by	the	EU	should	be	promoted.	There	is	
momentum	to	incorporate	stimulating	measures	for	CVD	into	the	implementation	of	the	NIS	
Directive.	For	this	the	EU	could	use	guidelines	advocating	for	(or	obligating)	national	CSIRTs	
or	essential	service	providers	to	implement	a	CVD	policy,	or	in	the	case	of	national	CSIRTs	to	
also	take	up	a	coordinating	role	in	the	process.	The	EU	should	not	come	up	with	everything	
on	 its	 own,	 but	 make	 use	 of	 the	 insights	 and	 best	 practices	 from	 international	 multi-
stakeholder	processes,	industry,	MS	and	other	governments.	
The	 EU	 could	 prescribe,	 or	 use	 insights	 from,	 the	 internationally	 agreed	 ISO-standards,	 of	
which	the	first	step	would	be	to	recommend	ISO	30111	to	 internally	organize	vulnerability	
reporting,	followed	by	ISO	29147	which	introduces	the	external	component.	Moreover,	the	
EU	 should	 seriously	 consider	 in	 what	 way	 and	 to	 what	 extent	 they	 could	 use	 the	 NIST-
Framework.	This	would	be	welcomed	by	the	industry	and	would	ensure	a	favorable	business	
climate	 for	 global	 companies	 in	 the	 EU,	 as	 it	 would	 prevent	 companies	 from	 having	 to	
comply	with	a	wide	variety	of	standards	and	national	requirements	in	different	parts	of	the	
world.	Moreover,	global	standards	are	better	suited	than	‘regional’	EU	standards	to	address	
cybersecurity	issues	because	of	its	borderless	nature.		
Furthermore,	 communication	 instruments	 are	 essential	 to	 stimulate	 CVD,	 particularly	 to	
provide	all	parties	involved	with	more	clarity	about	when	behavior	is	responsible.	Therefore,	
widespread	 implementation	 of	 CVD	 policies	 should	 be	 supported	 to	 come	 to	 a	 common	
agreement	that	vulnerability	details	will	not	be	published	before	they	are	solved	and	when	
following	 the	 rules	 in	 the	 policy	 legal	 action	 will	 not	 be	 taken.	 For	 making	 the	 legal	
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consequences	 of	 ethical	 hacking	 clearer,	 the	 EU	 should	 look	 at	 best	 practices	 from	 the	
Netherlands	–	the	CVD	policy	guideline	and	the	DPPs	 letter	explaining	which	criteria	 it	will	
use	 in	 cases	 of	 hacking.	 Moreover,	 using	 insights	 of	 the	 Just	 Culture	 initiative	 and	 the	
harmonization	of	regulation	in	the	aviation	sector	for	reporters	would	be	beneficial	because	
it	is	also	about	stimulating	responsible	reporting	of	security	issues.	
The	EU	could	use	a	combination	of	these	measures	to	stimulate	CVD	and	increase	the	legal	
certainty	 of	 ethical	 hackers	 to	 strengthen	 the	 resilience	 of	 the	 EU’s	 cyber	 ecosystem.	 By	
working	together	with	all	actors	involved,	the	EU	could	develop	a	culture	of	cybersecurity	at	
all	 levels	and	layers	(technical,	 legal,	policy)	and	among	all	stakeholders	(e.g.	governments,	
vendors,	 ethical	 hackers)	 by	 using	 instruments	 to	 raise	 awareness	 and	 transparency	 to	
ensure	learning	and	clarity	for	all	parties	involved.	From	a	cyber	resilience	perspective,	these	
measures	are	excellent	examples	of	working	in	partnerships,	making	use	of	the	expertise	of	
the	 private	 sector	 and	 converge	 amongst	 stakeholders	 on	 a	 common	 understanding	 of	
norms,	laws	and	standards	of	security	as	resilience	in	the	EU.			
Unfortunately,	 this	 thesis	could	not	extensively	elaborate	on	other	 important	debates	that	
are	also	relevant	if	the	EU	wants	to	increase	its	cyber	resilience	and	decrease	vulnerabilities	
in	 information	 systems.	 Important	 debates	 wherein	 technical	 and	 non-technical	 experts	
should	 exchange	 opinions	 about	 the	 desirability	 of	 keeping	 vulnerabilities	 secret	 for	
defensive	and	offensive	purposes	by	governments	and	intelligence	services;	how	to	develop	
incentives	for	companies	to	make	products	that	are	secure	by	design;	and	how	certification	
schemes	can	help	with	increasing	the	trust	in	information	systems	and	ethical	hackers.		
This	thesis	has	contributed	to	the	limited	amount	of	literature	on	this	subject	and	has	tried	
to	bridge	the	gap	between	the	technical	and	non-technical	(e.g.	policy,	legal)	worlds	by	using	
academic	 literature	and	primary	documents	 from	both	 sides.	 For	developing	effective	and	
efficient	 EU	 policies	 on	 cybersecurity	 this	 is	 essential.	 The	 highly	 technical	 nature	 of	
cybersecurity	issues	and	the	fast	technological	developments	are	reasons	why	policymakers	
in	the	EU	need	the	insights	from	the	technical	experts	who	are	at	the	forefront	of	increasing	
cybersecurity	 to	 create	 effective	 policies.	 The	 other	 way	 around,	 the	 industry	 and	
information	system	experts	should	critical	and	engage	with	policymakers	about	new	policies	
and	regulations.	Technical	and	non-technical	experts	of	public	and	private	parties	in	the	EU	
should	thus	bundle	their	forces	to	create	a	secure	cyber	ecosystem	for	all.			
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ANNEX	1:	EXAMPLE	OF	A	GOVERNMENTAL	CVD	POLICY		
Retrieved	from	www.ncsc.nl/english	
	
“The	National	Cyber	Security	Centre	(NCSC)	contributes	to	jointly	enhancing	the	resilience	of	
the	Dutch	society	in	the	digital	domain	and,	in	doing	so,	realises	a	safe,	open	and	stable	
information	society	by	providing	insight	and	offering	a	perspective	for	action.	Therefore	it	is	
essential	that	the	ICT	systems	of	the	NCSC	are	safe.	The	NCSC	strives	towards	providing	a	
high	level	of	security	for	its	systemn.	However,	it	can	occur	that	one	of	these	systems	has	a	
vulnerability.	
Vulnerabilities	in	ICT	systems	of	the	NCSC	
If	you	have	found	a	weak	spot	in	one	of	the	ICT	systems	of	the	NCSC,	the	NCSC	would	like	to	
hear	about	this	from	you,	so	the	necessary	measures	can	be	taken	as	quickly	as	possible	to	
rectify	the	vulnerability.	To	deal	with	the	vulnerabilities	in	the	NCSC	ICT	systems	responsibly,	
we	propose	several	agreements.	You	may	hold	the	NCSC	to	this	when	you	discover	a	weak	
spot	in	one	of	our	systems.	
The	NCSC	asks	you:	
• To	e-mail	your	findings	to	cert@ncsc.nl.	Encrypt	your	findings	if	possible	with	the	PGP	
Key	of	the	NCSC	to	prevent	the	information	falling	into	the	wrong	hands.	
• Provide	sufficient	information	to	reproduce	the	problem	so	that	the	NCSC	can	solve	the	
problem	as	quickly	as	possible.	The	IP	address	or	the	URL	of	the	system	affected	and	a	
description	of	the	vulnerability	is	usually	sufficient,	but	more	may	be	needed	for	more	
complex	vulnerabilities.	
• Leave	your	contact	details	so	that	the	NCSC	can	contact	you	to	cooperate	on	a	safe	result.	
At	least,	leave	an	e-mail	address	or	a	telephone	number.	
• Report	the	vulnerability	as	quickly	as	possible	after	its	discovery.	
• Do	not	share	the	information	on	the	security	problem	with	others	until	the	problem	has	
been	solved.	
• Handle	the	knowledge	on	the	security	problem	with	care	by	not	performing	any	acts	
other	than	those	necessary	to	reveal	the	security	problem.	
Avoid	in	any	case	the	following	acts:	
• installing	malware.	
• copying,	changing	or	deleting	data	in	a	system	(an	alternative	to	this	is	making	a	
directory	listing	of	a	system).	
• making	changes	to	a	system.	
• repeatedly	accessing	the	system	or	sharing	access	with	others.	
• using	so-called	“brute	force”	to	access	systems.	
• using	denial-of-service	or	social	engineering.	
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What	you	can	expect:	
• If	you	comply	with	the	conditions	above	when	reporting	the	observed	vulnerability	in	
an	ICT	system	of	the	NCSC,	the	NCSC	will	not	attach	any	legal	consequences	to	this	
report.	
• The	NCSC	handles	a	report	confidentially	and	does	not	share	personal	details	with	
third	parties	without	permission	from	the	reporter,	unless	this	is	mandatory	by	virtue	
of	a	judicial	decision.	
• In	mutual	consultation,	the	NCSC	can,	if	you	desire,	mention	your	name	as	the	
discoverer	of	the	reported	vulnerability.	
• The	NCSC	will	send	you	a	confirmation	of	receipt	within	one	working	day.	
• The	NCSC	responds	within	three	working	days	to	a	report	with	an	assessment	of	the	
report	and	an	expected	date	for	a	solution.	
• The	NCSC	keeps	the	reporter	up-to-date	on	the	progress	made	with	solving	the	
problem.	
• The	NCSC	solves	the	security	problems	observed	by	you	in	a	system	as	quickly	as	
possible,	but	no	later	than	within	60	days.	In	mutual	consultation,	whether	and	in	
what	way	the	problem	will	be	published,	after	it	has	been	solved,	is	determined.	
• The	NCSC	offers	a	reward	as	thanks	for	help.	Depending	on	the	seriousness	of	the	
security	problem	and	the	quality	of	the	report,	the	reward	can	vary	from	a	T-shirt	to	
maximum	EUR	300	in	gift	vouchers.	It	must	concern	a	serious	problem	that	is	
unknown	to	NCSC.	
	
Vulnerabilities	in	ICT	systems	of	third	parties:	
The	NCSC	would	like	to	hear	if	you	find	a	weak	spot	in	a	system	of	the	Dutch	government	or	
in	a	system	with	a	vital	role.	For	systems	of	other	owners/administrators	and/or	suppliers,	in	
the	first	instance	you	must	approach	the	organisation	yourself.	If	the	organisation	does	not	
or	inadequately	responds,	you	can	inform	the	NCSC.	In	this	regard,	the	NCSC	will	play	a	role	
as	intermediary	to	achieve	result	together.		
For	reports	on	systems	of	third	parties:	
• The	NCSC	will	respond	to	a	report	within	three	working	days	by	contacting	the	owner	
and	giving	you	a	response.	
• The	owner	is	primarily	responsible	for	keeping	the	reporter	informed	about	the	
progress	made	in	solving	the	problem.	
• The	NCSC	will	help	the	owner	with	advice	so	that	the	security	problem	can	be	solved	
as	quickly	as	possible.	
• The	NCSC	asks	you	to	give	us	information	on	whether	and	how	there	has	already	been	
contact	with	the	organisation.”	
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ANNEX	2:	EXAMPLE	OF	A	COMPANY’S	CVD	POLICY		
Retrieved	from	www.responsibledisclosure.nl/en		
“At	the	…	Corporation,	we	consider	the	security	of	our	systems	a	top	priority.	But	no	matter	
how	much	effort	we	put	into	system	security,	there	can	still	be	vulnerabilities	present.	
If	you	discover	a	vulnerability,	we	would	like	to	know	about	it	so	we	can	take	steps	to	address	
it	as	quickly	as	possible.	We	would	like	to	ask	you	to	help	us	better	protect	our	clients	and	our	
systems.	
Please	do	the	following:	
• E-mail	your	findings	to	cert@example.com.	Encrypt	your	findings	using	our	PGP	key	to	
prevent	this	critical	information	from	falling	into	the	wrong	hands,	
• Do	not	take	advantage	of	the	vulnerability	or	problem	you	have	discovered,	for	example	
by	downloading	more	data	than	necessary	to	demonstrate	the	vulnerability	or	deleting	or	
modifying	other	people's	data,	
• Do	not	reveal	the	problem	to	others	until	it	has	been	resolved,	
• Do	not	use	attacks	on	physical	security,	social	engineering,	distributed	denial	of	service,	
spam	or	applications	of	third	parties,	and	
• Do	provide	sufficient	information	to	reproduce	the	problem,	so	we	will	be	able	to	resolve	
it	as	quickly	as	possible.	Usually,	the	IP	address	or	the	URL	of	the	affected	system	and	a	
description	of	the	vulnerability	will	be	sufficient,	but	complex	vulnerabilities	may	require	
further	explanation.	
What	we	promise:	
• We	will	respond	to	your	report	within	3	business	days	with	our	evaluation	of	the	report	
and	an	expected	resolution	date,	
• If	you	have	followed	the	instructions	above,	we	will	not	take	any	legal	action	against	you	
in	regard	to	the	report,	
• We	will	handle	your	report	with	strict	confidentiality,	and	not	pass	on	your	personal	
details	to	third	parties	without	your	permission,	
• We	will	keep	you	informed	of	the	progress	towards	resolving	the	problem,	
• In	the	public	information	concerning	the	problem	reported,	we	will	give	your	name	as	the	
discoverer	of	the	problem	(unless	you	desire	otherwise),	and	
• As	a	token	of	our	gratitude	for	your	assistance,	we	offer	a	reward	for	every	report	of	a	
security	problem	that	was	not	yet	known	to	us.	The	amount	of	the	reward	will	be	
determined	based	on	the	severity	of	the	leak	and	the	quality	of	the	report.	The	minimum	
reward	will	be	a	€50	gift	certificate.	
We	strive	to	resolve	all	problems	as	quickly	as	possible,	and	we	would	like	to	play	an	active	
role	in	the	ultimate	publication	on	the	problem	after	it	is	resolved.”	
	
